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I. INTRODUCTION
It would unfold like the opening scene of a Tom Clancy novel,
but it would be all too real...
At 5:00 a.m., the urgent voice of a personal aide awakens the
President of the United States. Fumbling for the bedside light while
shaking off the fog of sleep, the Commander-in-Chief of the most
powerful military in the history of the world lazily wonders what the
crisis might be this time. Bosnia taking a turn for the worse? Or the
North Koreans, maybe there were some succession-related problems
finally turning up there. Stepping into his slippers, the President is
only halfway down the hallway when he is confronted by his Na-
tional Security Advisor (NSA). The NSA looks like he, too, has
been roughly pulled from sleep. Without preamble, he speaks.
"Mr. President, sir, I just got off the phone with the Director of
the FBL Sir, two hours ago, an FBI agent in New York received an
[Vol. 20:29
Nuclear Material Availability
anonymous phone call from a man threatening to detonate a nu-
clear bomb in lower Manhattan by midnight tomorrow night, unless
his demands are met. He gave the agent the address of an apart-
ment, said he'd call back in three hours with his demands, and hung
up. The agent assumed it was a crank call, but followed normal
procedure anyway, sending investigators over to the address. Mr.
President, those men found the door to the place open, with abso-
lutely nothing inside except an open suitcase. There was a small
packet in it, containing a piece of metal. Sir, they've already tested it
... it was... plutonium, sir. Mr. President, we need to act quickly.
If you'll come with me...
"My God..."
The horrible truth is that the threat of nuclear terrorism is
real, in light of the potential existence of a black market in fissile
material. Nuclear terrorists might issue demands, but then again,
they might not. Their target could be anything: a U.S. military
base in a foreign land, a crowded U.S. city, or an empty stretch of
desert highway. In one fell swoop, nuclear terrorists could decapi-
tate the U.S. government or destroy its financial system. The hu-
man suffering resulting from a detonation would be beyond calcu-
lation, and in the aftermath, the remains of the nation would
demand both revenge and protection. Constitutional liberties and
values might never recover.
When terrorists strike against societies already separated by
fundamental social fault lines, such as in Northern Ireland or Is-
rael, conventional weapons can exploit those fault lines to achieve
significant gains. 1 In societies that lack such pre-existing funda-
mental divisions, however, conventional weapon attacks do not
pose a top priority threat to national security, even though the pain
and suffering inflicted can be substantial. The bedrock institutions
of the United States will survive despite the destruction of federal
offices; the vast majority of people will continue to support the
Constitution despite the mass murder of innocent persons.
The consequences of terrorists employing weapons of mass
destruction, however, would be several orders of magnitude worse
than a conventional weapons attack. Although this threat includes
chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear weapon's devastating
1. See Philip B. Heymann, The U.S. and Terrorism 9 (June 19, 1996) [hereinafter
Heymann] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Journal).
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potential is in a class by itself.2 Nuclear terrorism thus poses a
unique danger to the United States: through its sheer power to
slay, destroy, and terrorize, a nuclear weapon would give terrorists
the otherwise-unavailable ability to bring the United States to its
knees. Therefore, preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear
weapons should be considered an unparalleled national security
priority dominating other policy considerations.
A would-be nuclear terrorist's only real obstacle is the diffi-
culty inherent in acquiring an adequate amount of weapon-usable
nuclear material. In years past, terrorists had little prospect of ac-
quiring this material. Those few nations that possessed nuclear
weapons material kept their caches under the highest security
conditions. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, has
changed this situation.
Presently, large amounts of unsecured and unaccounted-for
weapons-usable material are scattered throughout the former So-
viet Union.3 Moreover, deteriorating economic conditions have
generated powerful incentives among soldiers and scientists in the
former Soviet Union to provide "insider" access to this material.
Such access bypasses even the scant security measures actually in
place.4 Police in Europe have already confirmed several instances
of attempted fissile material smuggling, and these incidents may
only be the tip of the iceberg.5
This Article explores the contours of fissile material availabil-
ity from the perspective of terrorism prevention. Part II provides a
framework for consideration of this issue by establishing the over-
whelming significance of fissile material availability. Part III con-
ducts an in-depth review of the nascent black market in weapons-
usable material, focusing on the security problems in the former
Soviet Union. Part IV examines the nature of the U.S. response to
this problem. It identifies the most significant programs and policy
initiatives, highlights their limitations, and concludes that the
United States has failed to adequately prioritize prevention efforts.
Part V considers the impact of recent legislative modifications to
2. See id. at 118.
3. See id. at 121.
4. Oleg Bukharin & William C. Potter, Potatoes Were Guarded Better, BULL. OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May-June 1995, at 48,49.
5. Wendy L. Mirsky, The Link Between Russian Organized Crime and Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation: Fighting Crime and Ensuring International Security, 16 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 749, 753 (1995).
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the U.S. effort and finds that the U.S. response to the threat of
nuclear terrorism remains inadequate. In Part VI, the Article
concludes that to implement policies commensurate with the de-
gree of risk to the national security, a significant shift in the per-
ception of the stakes involved must take place among both politi-
cians and the public. Such a shift would generate the political
maneuverability to enact truly comprehensive and effective pre-
vention measures, but achieving it will probably require the active
engagement of the agenda-setting and persuasive powers of the
Presidency; the alternative is to proceed with half-measures in the
face of a cataclysmic risk.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FIssILE MATERIAL AVAILABILITY
A. Framework For Nuclear Terrorism Prevention
There can be little doubt that the national security of the
United States is inversely related to the number of state and sub-
state actors that have weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which
include nuclear, chemical, and biological arms. 6 When former
Secretary of Defense William Perry recently articulated the bed-
rock principles underlying U.S. defense policy, he declared that
"[t]he U.S. program of preventative defense rests on the premise
that fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes
America and the world safer."' 7 The threat to the United States,
however, is not limited to the military use of WMD by a hostile
state. A WMD strike against U.S. interests would cause disastrous
loss of life and property regardless of the attacker's identity. Con-
sidering the context of recent trends in terrorist activity, this ob-
servation is cause for alarm.
Two terrorist trends in particular give rise to concern. First,
terrorists have broken the taboo against the use of WMDs. 8 On
6. A "weapon of mass destruction" is "any weapon or device that is intended, or has
the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people
through the release, dissemination, or impact of-(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or
their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity." Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (1996).
7. William J. Perry, Defense in an Age of Hope, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 64,
66.
8. The scenario of a terrorist group either obtaining or manufacturing and using
a weapon of mass destruction is no longer the stuff of science fiction or even ad-
venture movies. It is a reality which has come to pass and one which, if we do
not take appropriate measures, will increasingly threaten us in the future.
Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Hearings on S. 104-422 Before the
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June 27, 1994, members of the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult con-
ducted a sarin nerve gas attack in Matsumoto City, Japan, killing 7
and hospitalizing over 500 others.9 Less than a year later, the cult
again employed sarin gas, in the infamous Tokyo subway attack,
this time killing 12 and injuring over 5000 people.10 These inci-
dents marked the first significant uses of weapons of mass destruc-
tion by non-state actors, "signal[ling that] the world has entered
into a new era."11
Although these particular incidents did not directly target the
United States, it would be a mistake to assume that this new trend
did not concern U.S. security. The Aum believe that they have
reason to take action against the United States. For example, "a
core belief of the Aum was that the United States was their enemy
and... a war with the United States was a central component of
their prediction of Armageddon. '' 12
The second major development was the appearance of large-
scale terrorist violence within the United States itself. First, the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York by follow-
ers of the "Blind Shaykh," led by Umar Abd al-Rahman, shocked
a country complacent in the belief that attacks of this magnitude
could, and would, only occur abroad.13 The results of the World
Trade Center bombing paled, however, in comparison to the car-
nage caused by the April 19, 1995, attack on the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City. That attack killed 168 persons and
wounded more than 500 others. 14
Combining these trends, it is clear that the probability of a
terrorist attack within the United States, employing a WMD, has
grown to unprecedented levels. This conclusion is consistent with
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
104th Cong. 5 (Part I) (1995) [hereinafter WMD Hearings Part 1] (opening statement of
U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)). "Terrorists are turning increasingly to 'super-terror'-
weapons of mass destruction." Charles E. Schumer, Terrorism Must Not Be Allowed to
Hide Its Face, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 2 (1996).
9. The attack was an assassination attempt directed at three judges who were hear-
ing a case involving the cult at that time. See WMD Hearing Part I, supra note 8, at 23
(testimony of John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority, Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations, U.S. Senate).
10. See id at 5 (opening statement of Senator Sam Nunn).
11. Id
12 See id at 8 (testimony of John F. Sopko).
13. See U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 1995
Patterns of Global Terrorism (1996) (visited on Sept. 5, 1997) <gopher://gopher.state.gov:
70/00ftp...%20Terrorism%3A1995%20PGT%20Report>.
14. See id.
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a belief that terrorist activity normally poses a true threat to a so-
ciety only when it can exploit pre-existing fractures within that so-
ciety. In societies relatively devoid of such fundamental fault lines,
such as the United States, terrorists intent on having a real impact
may be driven to employ tactics of far greater destructive magni-
tude.15
Even absent the logic of fault lines, however, it is conceivable
that a terrorist group might resort to a WMD attack if sufficiently
frustrated in its conventional attempts to further its aims. 16 This
grim prospect is disturbing enough when the threat is limited to
chemical and biological weapons, the impact of a nuclear terrorist
attack would involve nightmarish consequences on an incompara-
ble scale. 17 According to former CIA Director John Deutch, the
United States is poorly prepared to deal with nuclear terrorism.
18
Therefore, it is absolutely crucial that policy makers give thought-
ful consideration to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The United
States must develop both effective policies and the political capital
to execute them.19
There will be numerous obstacles to crafting an effective
counterterrorist policy. Foremost is the likelihood that nuclear
terrorism countermeasures cannot be developed on a narrowly-
targeted basis.20 This consequence flows from the multiplicity of
both targets and terrorists. The almost limitless supply of federal
buildings, landmarks, historic locations, and population centers
within the United States makes specific-target hardening a strategy
15. See Heymann, supra note 1, at 119.
16. Broadly speaking, terrorists will not engage in overkill if their traditional
weapons... are sufficient to continue the struggle and achieve their aims. But
the decision to use terrorist violence is not always a rational one.... What if, af-
ter years of armed struggle and the loss of many of their militants, terrorist
groups see no progress? Despair could lead to giving up the armed struggle, or
to suicide. But it might also lead to a last desperate attempt to defeat the hated
enemy by arms not tried before.
Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, FOREIGN AFi., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 24, 31.
17. "Chances are that of 100 attempts at terrorist superviolence, 99 would fail. But
the single successful one could claim many more victims, do more material damage, and
unleash far greater panic than anything the world has yet experienced." Id at 36.
18 See Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Hearings on S. 104-422
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 104th Cong. 76 (Part II) (1996) [hereinafter WMD Hearings Part If] (testimony
of John Deutch, Dir., Central Intelligence Agency).
19. A variety of initiatives have already been attempted, or are currently on deck;
their relative merits are considered below in Parts IV-V.
20. Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GEO. J. INT'L
& Comp. L. 1, 18 (1994).
1997]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
that is unlikely to even marginally decrease the risk of nuclear ter-
rorism. Similarly, it is unwise to depend to any great extent on a
strategy of identifying the likeliest perpetrators of nuclear terror-
ism, as "there is no such thing as 'the terrorist mind"' 21 enabling
precise identification of a subset of terrorists likely to take the nu-
clear leap. Thus, absent fortuitous intelligence, targeted preven-
tion is insufficient to address this problem. Fortunately, there is
still the option of untargeted prevention.
"Prevention of nuclear terrorism should, like all prevention,
focus on the steps in the terrorist plan that can be made most diffi-
cult at a reasonable cost. .... ",22 This strategy requires the identifi-
cation of the likeliest chokepoint(s) among the chain of conditions
necessary for a terrorist to succeed with nuclear terrorism. 23
Broadly speaking, nuclear terrorism cannot take place without
sufficient amounts of the following ingredients: technical knowl-
edge, funds, equipment, transportation, willpower, credibility, and
fissile material. Untargeted prevention seeks to identify which, if
any, of these inputs is a chokepoint, susceptible to substantial dis-
ruption.24
B. Identifying the Nuclear Chokepoint
Despite popular belief to the contrary, the technical knowl-
edge necessary to construct a nuclear weapon is widely available in
the public literature,25 and there is no requirement of access to
classified literature.26 Nor would a terrorist have to attempt the
more elaborate designs employed by a Los Alamos scientist; the
simplest designs would be capable of producing yields in the range
of several kilotons.27 In addition, the Internet has accentuated the
21. Id.
22. Heymann, supra note 1, at 121.
23. Id. at 122.
24. See id.
25. "The recipe... is no secret, and has not changed appreciably in many decades ...
All the information necessary to solve [the more difficult technical] problems . . . are
available in the open literature, and have been for some time." Owen R. Cotd, Jr., Ap-
pendix B: A Primer on Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons Design, in AvOIDING
NUCLEAR ANARCHY: CONTAINING THE THREAT OF LOOSE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND FISSILE MATERIAL 203, 224 (1996) [hereinafter Fissile Material Primer]; see also In-
terview with Ted Taylor, Morning Edition. Nuclear Safety and Security in Russia-Part 2,
(National Public Radio, Apr. 17, 1996), available in 1996 WL 2814493.
26. See Beres, supra note 20, at 14, citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS (1977).
27. See Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 214. One kiloton is equivalent to a
[Vol. 20:29
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widespread dissemination of the relevant technical knowledge. 28
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that censoring this in-
formation from the information superhighway would impose any
real burden on the ability of a terrorist to fabricate a nuclear de-
vice.
Nor would funding and equipment requirements pose a sig-
nificant obstacle. 29 The Office of Technology Assessment con-
cluded that less than $1 million dollars would be necessary to cre-
ate a nuclear weapon.30 While this is a significant amount, it is no
doubt available to a subset of potential nuclear terrorists. In any
event, existing anti-terrorism legislation already seeks to constrict
the flow of funds to terrorist organizations. 31 According to Profes-
sor Graham Allison, a few hundred thousand dollars could satisfy
the funding needs, and the equipment is readily available at stores
such as Radio Shack.32
Once built, it would be a simple matter to transport a nuclear
device. The fissile material component of the device, comprised of
either uranium or plutonium, would be neither heavy nor un-
wieldly. 33 Approximately twenty-five kilograms of uranium, or
eight kilograms of plutonium, could suffice for a bomb. 34 Such a
quantity of uranium would be about the size of a grapefruit, while
thousand tons of TNT. For a comparison, the yield of the "Little Boy," dropped on Hi-
roshima, was approximately 15 kilotons. See id at 222.
2& See, e.g., J.D. Dyson, Documentation and Diagrams of the Atomic Bomb (visited
on Oct. 8, 1996) <http://neutrino.nuc.berkley.edu/neutronics/todd/nuc.bomb.html>.
29. See Beres, supra note 20, at 14, citing U.S. Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS (1977).
30. See id
31. See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132 (Apr. 1996); Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109
HARV. L. REV. 2074 (1996).
32- See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 22 (testimony of Graham T. Allison,
Ctr. for Science and Int'l Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Gov't, Harv. Univ.).
33. See id.
34. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 18 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson,
Jr., Assoc. Dir., Int'l Relations and Trade Issues, National Sec. and Int'l Affairs Division,
General Accounting Office). These amounts presume a high degree of "purity." In other
words, certain isotopes of plutonium and uranium can constitute a critical mass at lower
weights, and the greater the percentage of those isotopes in the fissile material batch, the
less it will be necessary for the weapon to weigh. Note that the relationship is not linear;
thus, a uranium core with 50% U-235 has a critical mass at a weight three times greater
than that of a core with 90% U-235. Further, the use of a neutron-reflecting metal sur-
face in the weapon's design can dramatically reduce the amount of the element needed to
achieve critical mass. See Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 206.
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the plutonium mass would be equivalent to a baseball.35 The
greater the purity of the fissile material involved, the smaller the
nuclear device's physics would be package.36 An ordinary vehicle
could probably transport the entire device.37 Furthermore, fissile
materials, including plutonium or enriched uranium, pose almost
negligible health threats to those handling them directly.38 Pluto-
nium's radioactive emissions, known as alpha particles, are unable
to penetrate the skin, and thus do not pose significant harm unless
ingested. Uranium is also safe to handle, and would have to be in-
gested in significant quantities before a health problem arose.
39
Questions of willpower are clearly beyond the scope of gov-
ernment intervention, even the most draconian disincentives for
participation in nuclear terrorism will probably fail to dissuade at
least some marginal terrorists. After all, it is plausible to argue
that, at the very least, a subset of terrorists are not rational actors:
"the decision to use terrorist violence is not always a rational one;
if it were, there would be much less terrorism, since terrorist activ-
ity seldom achieves its aims."40
The question of credibility is similarly unproductive. If nu-
clear terrorists sought to employ their nuclear device as a bargain-
ing chip, they could obtain the necessary credibility either by pro-
viding a sample of the fissile material employed in the weapon, or
worse, by actually detonating a device. This analysis leaves only
one input to which terrorists can realistically be denied access:
fissile material.
C. The Need to Restrict Access to Fissile Material
1. Overview: Physics of a Simple Nuclear Weapon
"There is an overwhelming consensus that fissile material
constitutes the major obstacle to a simple nuclear weapons capabil-
ity." 41 A nuclear weapon cannot be fabricated without either plu-
35. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 22 (testimony of Graham T. Alli-
son).
36. See Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 210.
37. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 22 (testimony of Graham T. Alli-
son).
38. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET AL., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY 44 (1995).
39. See id at 45.
40. Laqueur, supra note 16, at 31.
41. Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 225.
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tonium or enriched uranium.42 The nuclei of these elements are
capable of fission,43 which occurs when a nucleus, struck by a neu-
tron from any source, splits into two parts. These two successor
elements combined will have less atomic mass than the original
nucleus, with the difference having been transformed into a re-
lease of various forms of radiation. Not all isotopes of uranium
and plutonium fission with equal ease. The odd-numbered iso-
topes of both are considered "fissile," in that fission will occur
whenever a neutron strikes their nuclei.44 In contrast, some iso-
topes are merely "fissionable," in that only neutrons with sufficient
levels of energy can cause their nuclei to fission. Thus, fissile iso-
topes, are preferred for weapons purposes.
When a nucleus fissions, the neutrons emitted are capable of
striking a neighboring nucleus, potentially triggering more fis-
sion.45 When each fission reaction triggers at least one other fis-
sion reaction, a chain reaction is created.46 When each reaction
triggers more than one reaction, an explosive chain reaction oc-
curs. A mass of fissile material sufficient to cause such a reaction
is called a supercritical mass, which is achieved by using force to
compress non-critical masses of the material together.47 Roughly
speaking, this is what occurs when a nuclear device is detonated.
Significantly, Pu-239's critical mass is significantly smaller than
that of U-235. Thus, a plutonium device can be much smaller than
a uranium weapon.48
Obviously, then, those wishing to possess the power of a nu-
clear weapon must first possess an adequate amount of fissile (or
fissionable) material. 49 This can only be achieved by either creat-
42. See id. at 204-14. This bare bones account is entirely derived from Mr. Cotd's in-
sightful primer. For clarity's sake, this Article does not attempt to provide anything ap-
proaching a detailed review of the physics of a nuclear weapon. It deals with the topic
only to the extent necessary to facilitate an understanding of the significance of various
facets of the fissile material security problem in the former Soviet Union. For a more de-
tailed account, see id at 204-14.
43. Since hydrogen bombs present far less likely pathways to nuclear terrorism due to
added complexities, this Article does not address fusion.
44. See Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 204.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally id
49. Since it would be more difficult to create a supercritical mass with fissionable ma-
terial than it would with fissile material, for the remainder of this Article it will be as-
sumed that the threat to be addressed concerns weapons relying on the latter.
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ing the material or acquiring it. To understand why both the hopes
and fears of those seeking to prevent nuclear terrorism rest on the
prospects of the latter option, the greater difficulties attached to
the former option, creating the material, must first be discussed.
Of course, sub-state actors themselves are highly unlikely to be in
a position to create their own fissile material. They may in certain
instances, however, benefit from the indigenous nuclear programs
of patron states.50
2. The Indigenous Production Route
To develop a uranium-based weapon requires complex indus-
trial processes, because it is difficult to aggregate a sufficient
amount of the fissile isotope U-235; that isotope accounts for only
.072% of natural uranium. 51 Developing a useful quantity of U-
235 requires "enrichment. '52 Enrichment is the immensely diffi-
cult process of separating U-235 from the more common isotopes
of uranium, which are relatively indistinct from one another
chemically.53
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) can be produced in several
different ways. All of the options, however, require technologies
that are both extraordinarily difficult to hide from outside observ-
ers and are equally as difficult to obtain. The acquisition hurdle
results from efforts to restrict the transfer of technologies adapt-
able to this purpose, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.54 In light of these obstacles, it is highly unlikely that an
aspiring proliferant could successfully produce its own HEU with-
out drawing the full attention of the global community in ad-
vance. 55
50. The fissile material prospects of some proliferant states are discussed below. See
infra Part III.B.2.
51. See Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 212.
52. A 20% level of U-235 would suffice to create a weapon, though to qualify as the
much preferable (for size of critical mass reasons) "weapons grade" requires approxi-
mately a 93% U-235 level. Id. at 216-17.
53. See id at 216.
54. See id at 221-22.
55. It is not, however, impossible. Iraq, for example, progressed far beyond the ex-
pectations of outside observers in its uranium enrichment program. In fact, it appears
that they developed sufficient HEU for at least a small weapon and would have certainly
had much more if their crash program had reached its fruition in the end of 1991. The
Persian Gulf War and the efforts of both the United Nations Special Commission and the
International Atomic Energy Agency seem to have reduced this threat. See WMD Hear-
ings Part II, supra note 18, at 98 (testimony of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive
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Nor would proliferants have much success producing their
own plutonium. Plutonium is created in nuclear reactors when
nuclei of the non-fissile isotope U-238 (which comprises the bulk
of most reactor fuel) are joined by neutrons emitted in the fission
process. Given their disparate chemical natures, the process of
separating the plutonium from the uranium (reprocessing) is less
difficult than uranium enrichment. Thus, the plutonium option is
relatively feasible. Regardless, the technology required is ex-
traordinarily difficult to disguise and is highly restricted on global
markets.
In short, home-grown production of fissile material is effec-
tively limited. First, the non-proliferation regime, in combination
with individual state efforts, provides a system of economic re-
striction and sanction that limits and deters the acquisition of the
relevant technologies. Second, nuclear weapons states maintain a
careful vigil over developments in aspiring nuclear weapons states.
Both of these factors necessitate slow, covert development of in-
digenous production capacity, if there is to be any such capacity at
all.56
If the patronage of a proliferant state were the only route by
which terrorists might obtain fissile material, then there would be
relatively little cause for concern. The difficulties inherent in the
indigenous development of fissile material already provides a win-
dow of opportunity in which the United States can act to prevent
the successful culmination of such projects. 57 This has the result of
reducing the pressure to develop and implement new prevention
policies targeted at this particular route. Unfortunately, patronage
is not the most likely pathway for terrorists to obtain fissile mate-
rial.
3. The Underappreciated Black Market Route
A terrorist group seeking to obtain fissile material will turn, if
at all possible, to the black market. The illicit sale of fissile mate-
rial enables the purchaser, whether a state or a sub-state actor, to
Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission).
56. See Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 221-22.
57. For example, the United States was able to successfully negotiate a suspension of
North Korea's indigenous plutonium production program. See Hearing on Current and
Projected National Security Threats to the United States before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter National Security Hearing] (testimony of
Toby T. Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research), available in
1997 WL 8218799.
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avoid all obstacles inherent in the production of the material, es-
sentially nullifying the entire process-based prevention system
outlined above. As Graham Allison states, "[w]hen fissile material
itself is on sale, the traditional source of leverage on the nonprolif-
eration challenge disappears... nuclear leakage enables states [or
anyone else for that matter] to leap over the hardest part of acquir-
ing nuclear weapons."' 58 Thus, the ultimate question, from the per-
spective of nuclear terrorism prevention, is whether or not a nu-
clear black market exists.
The purported nuclear black market has its roots, ironically,
in the United States' Cold War victory over the Soviet Union.59
For decades, the analysis of the nuclear threat facing the United
States was driven almost exclusively by considerations of Cold
War tensions and the nuclear arms race. Thus, the national secu-
rity of the United States was thought to be advanced by, first, a
series of nuclear disarmament treaties and, second, the collapse of
the Soviet Union.60 Unfortunately, these Cold War successes si-
multaneously decreased the level of security surrounding the
world's largest collection of fissile material. 61 To the degree that
decreased security has increased the probability that terrorists will
gain possession of fissile material, the declining odds of nuclear
war have raised the odds of nuclear terrorism.
Despite the overwhelming consensus among experts that un-
secured nuclear material in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) con-
stitutes a top priority national security threat, this dynamic is not
widely appreciated. The National Academy of Sciences issued a
report in 1994, describing the status of fissile material in the FSU
as a "clear and present danger to national . . . security. ' 62 This
warning, however, did not trigger a substantial increase in public
58. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 52.
59. See Mirsky, supra note 5, at 751.
60. In 1991, the Doomsday Clock, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' measure of
the proximity of nuclear war, was set back to 17 minutes to midnight, its most optimistic
placement ever. See Listen to the Nuclear Clock Tick, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Dec. 11,
1995, at 33.
61. While the fall of the Soviet Union has certainly diminished the risk of a ma-
jor war between the United States and a would-be challenger, it has also created
new risks which could have a very severe impact on the United States ... the
challenge ... is to ensure that the former Soviet Union does not become a vast
supermarket for the most deadly instruments known to man. Unfortunately,
there are already many prospective customers.
WMD Hearings Part I, supra note 8, at 4-5 (opening statement of Senator Sam Nunn).
62. Jessica Mathews, Beware the Loose Nukes, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at A13.
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concern. 63 The issue did receive top-level attention, however, in
the wake of the Aum Shinrikyo's taboo-breaking sarin gas attack.
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, chaired by Senator Richard
Lugar (R-IN), held hearings on WMD proliferation during 1995
and 1996.64 These hearings brought together academic experts
and government officials in an effort to determine the nature and
the adequacy of the U.S. response to the WMD threat. The
committee focused much attention on loose fissile material in the
FSU.65 In the wake of the testimony, Senator Lugar concluded
that the "U.S. response 'has not even begun to approximate U.S.
stakes in the matter."' 66
In contrast to the vivid threat of nuclear conflict during the
Cold War, the post-Cold War threat of loose nuclear material does
not resonate with most Americans. Senator Lugar attempted to
forge popular support for his campaign for the 1996 Republican
Presidential nomination by highlighting the nuclear terrorism
threat. He ran a series of ads in New Hampshire and Iowa con-
taining dramatic portrayals of domestic nuclear terrorism scenar-
ios, but voters paid scant attention. 67 It did not appear that the
public believed another candidate could better address this issue;
rather, "[t]hey've simply said that it's irrelevant. '68 In short,
"nobody gets it. Mostly people don't believe it. Even when you
say it, mostly people don't take it seriously .... [I]t is a matter of
waking up to something that is fairly unbelievable." 69 Such disbe-
lief is prominent despite expert consensus that the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and weapons-capacity powerfully invokes the
national interest of the United States.70 If a nuclear black market
63. Id.
64. See WMD Hearings Part I, supra note 8; WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18.
Senator Lugar has been joined by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) in his tireless efforts to
promote awareness of this threat and generate the necessary political momentum to act
decisively in response to it. See WMD Hearings Part I, supra note 8; WMD Hearings Part
II, supra note 18.
65. See WMD Hearings Part I, supra note 8; WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18.
66. Mathews, supra note 63.
67. See Alexander and Lugar Give Up Race, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 6, 1996 at 8A,
available in 1996 WL 3539995.
68. Id.
69. WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 23 (testimony of Graham T. Allison).
70. "The threat of nuclear diversion and trafficking from the former Soviet Union is
our Nation's No. 1 national security threat. The threat is not theoretical, but real. .. "
WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 131 (testimony of John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief
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has indeed risen from the ashes of the Soviet nuclear complex,
then this disjunction between perceptions and realities could prove
disastrous for national security, since the political pressure neces-
sary to vitalize and expedite a decisive policy reaction appears to
be missing.
III. THE NASCENT FISSILE MATERIAL BLACK MARKET
If there were no grounds for fearing that fissile material can,
realistically, be obtained by terrorists, then it would be unneces-
sary to clamor for extraordinary preventive measures. The truth
is, unfortunately, that the conditions of supply security in the FSU
constitute just such grounds.71 The evidence indicates overwhelm-
ingly that fissile material in the FSU is currently vulnerable to
theft, particularly by those with inside access. Moreover, there is
little border security to prevent the export of stolen material. 72
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that a demand for this ma-
terial exists. In fact, there have been several confirmed incidents
of actual fissile material theft and smuggling. Worse, it is likely
that these incidents only constitute the visible tip of a black market
iceberg. The inescapable conclusion is that there is a supply of
fissile material within terrorists' reach.
A. Fissile Material Security in the Former Soviet Union
Confidence in the security of a fissile material cache derives
from: (1) knowing the exact amount of material that should be
present; (2) maintaining the best available protective measures to
guard it; and (3) ensuring this amount remains intact. This mix of
security inputs is referred to as material protection, control, and
accounting (MPC&A). 73
The inadequacy of MPC&A within the states of the FSU is
the primary cause of concern. The security of most of the material
in the possession of the Russian military reasonably approaches
that provided by the U.S. military and civil sectors. 74 This subset
of secure materials, however, is a dwindling island in a growing sea
of insecurity, wherein mounting economic pressures both enable
and exacerbate the possibility of fissile material diversion. Before
Counsel to the Minority, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, U.S. Senate).
71. See Mirsky, supra note 5, at 756.
72. Id at 776.
73. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 80.
74. Id at 39.
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identifying the specific shortcomings of security within the FSU,
however, it is worth comparing the chains of fissile material cus-
tody in the United States and in Russia in order to appreciate why
the FSU's problems are likely to get worse in the coming years.
1. Comparing U.S. and FSU Fissile Material Security Practices
In both the United States and Russia, 75 actual possession of
uranium and plutonium is distributed among a variety of entities,
each with varying standards of security for the material in their
possession. 76 A short comparison of the nuclear networks in the
United States and Russia demonstrates that the Russians are faced
with a unique problem that seriously aggravates the MPC&A con-
cerns outlined below.
The United States currently possesses approximately 500
metric tons of HEU and 100 metric tons of plutonium.77 The
United States ceased producing new HEU for weapons in the
1960s, and stopped new naval fuel production in the 1980s.78 To-
day, the only active HEU chain is a one-way link between the U.S.
Navy and the pre-existing national HEU stockpile in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. 79 In addition, the United States ceased production of
plutonium in 1989.80 The only significant movement within the
nuclear complex, aside from the one-way naval fuel chain, is the
dismantlement and storage of nuclear weapons components, which
is expected to end at the turn of the century. 81
The dismantlement and storage process begins when a U.S.
nuclear weapon is due to be dismantled. At.this point, the De-
partment of Defense (Defense) transports it to one of 196 heavily
guarded underground concrete bunkers, where custody is trans-
75. This subsection deals exclusively with fissile material security within Russia be-
cause it seeks to illustrate the particular aggravating effect of nuclear weapon dismantle-
ment on Russian security, as well as to demonstrate why parallel concerns have not arisen
within the United States. This is not meant to suggest that similar security concerns do
not exist in the other states of the FSU.
76. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 198-99.
77. Owen R. Cotd, Jr., Appendix A: The Russian Nuclear Archipelago, in AVOIDING
NUCLEAR ANARCHY: CONTAINING THE THREAT OF LOOSE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL 177, 199 (1996) [hereinafter Russian Nuclear Archi-
pelago].
78. See id. at 198.
79. See id at 198-99.
80. See id. at 198.
81. See id at 199.
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ferred to the Department of Energy (Energy).82 Energy transports
the weapon to the Pantex facility in Amarillo, Texas, where it is
again stored in a heavily guarded underground concrete bunker.
Once dismantled, HEU components are sent to the national
stockpile at Oak Ridge, while plutonium is kept at Pantex. In ei-
ther case, there is a surplus of storage "slots" available within
these maximum security installations, obviating the need for po-
tential low-security improvisation. Every last gram of the material
is painstakingly accounted for and guarded.83 The key points of
interest in this brief overview are, first, that the United States is no
longer producing fissile material; second, that civilian MPC&A is
both highly effective and unaffected by the flood of materials en-
tering civilian custody due to weapons dismantlement. Unfortu-
nately, neither of these conditions exist in the Russian system.
Russia currently possesses approximately twice as much HEU
(1 kiloton) and plutonium (200 tons) as does the United States. 84
Moreover, the Russian stockpiles are being increased through
weapons dismantlement and continued production. 85 Dismantle-
ment is proceeding at a pace of between two and three thousand
weapons per year, injecting an additional fifteen tons of plutonium
and forty-five tons of HEU into the system annually. 86 Ongoing
plutonium production at three Russian reactors contributes an
additional 2.5 tons per year, but there is only a minimal amount of
continued HEU production.87 These numbers are not appreciably
different from those that the U.S. nuclear material system must
absorb in these years of disarmament. There is, however, a crucial
distinction between the two systems: when fissile materials leave
the relatively secure-hands of the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MOD), and fall into the possession of the Ministry of Atomic En-
ergy (MinAtom), they are no longer adequately protected. "In the
U.S., these components are being stored in highly secure, unused
weapons storage bunkers. In Russia, they are being stored in con-
82. See id at 196.
83. See id.
84. See Morning Edition: Nuclear Safety and Security in Russia-Part 1, National Pub-
lic Radio (Apr. 16, 1996), available in 1996 WL 28814493 [hereinafter Nuclear Safety and
Security].
85. See Russian Nuclear Archipelago, supra note 77, at 199.
86. See David Hoffman, Russia's Nuclear Sieve; Moscow Meeting to Focus on Plug-
ging Safety Gaps, WASH. POST, Apr. 17,1996, at A25.
87. See Russian Nuclear Archipelago, supra note 77, at 199.
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verted warehouses with much less security. ' 88 Thus, successful
weapons conversion has turned out to be a double-edged sword:
the more nuclear weapons are dismantled, the more fissile mate-
rial is subject to theft.89
The retraction of Russia's nuclear arsenal since the early
1980s has drastically exacerbated the shortage of slots in Russia.
Over a six year period, some 12,000 weapons were removed from,
initially, Eastern Europe, and later, other states of the FSU.90 At
the same time, the retraction of borders has prevented Russian ac-
cess to many previously available storage sites. Due to the con-
solidation and dismantlement trends, Russian secured storage ca-
pacity is being overwhelmed.
The most shocking aspect of this story is that there are avail-
able secured storage slots. MOD's weapons storage bunkers have
been emptying at a fast rate, and the overflow of fissile materials in
MinAtom custody could be substantially accommodated by them.
All that is required is that dismantled weapons components be re-
turned to the secured slots they occupied when in the form of nu-
clear weapons.91 This would require MinAtom to return the fissile
material to MOD. For bureaucratic and political reasons, how-
ever, it is utterly unlikely that MinAtom will relinquish its custody
of this vast amount of potential hard-currency generating mate-
rial.92
MinAtom's top officials have demonstrated a disturbing
proclivity to promote the use of nuclear technology, even
at the risk of increased proliferation, as in their insistent
campaign to complete nuclear reactor deals with Iran and
their rather resentful response to suggestions for improved
safeguards at their own facilities. 93
Moreover, MinAtom's unsecured backlog continues to in-
crease in four locations, each within a "closed city": Chelyabinsk,
88. Id. at 189.
89. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 133 (testimony of John F. Sopko).
90. See Russian Nuclear Archipelago, supra note 77, at 179.
91. See i&. at 190. Another option is to forego dismantlement in the first place, leav-
ing the material within the weapons, and thus denying MinAtom the chance to ever ac-
quire custody. This rests on the view that "there is more reason to be confident in the
ability of the Russian military to safeguard these materials than in that of the nuclear en-
thusiasts at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy." Alton Frye, Banning Ballistic Missiles,
FoREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 99, 104.
92. See Russian Nuclear Archipelago, supra note 77, at 191.
93. Frye, supra note 91, at 105.
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Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Sverdlovsk. 94 The first three locations
also store Russia's newly-produced plutonium.95 These are not,
however, the only locations, within the Russian nuclear network
with security problems. For example, fissile material also exists in
an inadequately secured state at several research laboratories. 96
Recent cooperative efforts between Russian and U.S. labs, how-
ever, have substantially improved conditions at some of these fa-
cilities, such as the Kurchatov Institute.97
The Russian naval fuel cycle raises even greater concerns.
William Potter, Director of the Center for Russian and Eurasian
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, pointed
to the inadequate protection of fresh naval reactor HEU as a top
concern.98 There are approximately ninety-six tons of HEU in the
naval fuel cycle, with much of this amount in the form of fresh fuel
rods stored on site at Russian shipyards 99 under low-security con-
ditions. 100 The naval fuel problem is more than a matter of front-
end security, however, as dozens of Russian submarines have been
decommissioned without having their reactors removed.101
The potential trouble spots number approximately ninety fa-
cilities, each storing fissile material without adequate security,
94. The Soviet Union created ten "secret" cities for the nuclear industry, each revolv-
ing around a MinAtom laboratory or facility designed for material, component, or weap-
ons research and fabrication. Travel to and from these cities is restricted. Interior Minis-
try soldiers guard the outside and FSB troops guard the inside. Approximately 700,000
people inhabit the closed cities and MinAtom is largely responsible for their welfare. See
Russian Nuclear Archipelago, supra note 77, at 181-84.
95. See id at 200.
96. For example, at Obninsk, a vault storing pellet-sized plutonium elements was
guarded with only a wax seal. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 20 (testimony
of Harold J. Johnson, Jr.).
97. See Nuclear Safety and Security, supra note 84.
98. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 29 (testimony of William C. Potter,
Dir. of the Ctr. for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Monterey Institute for Int'l Studies).
99. Largely located in Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok. See Russian Nuclear
Archipelago, supra note 77, at 185.
100. In a 1993 visit to the Murmansk naval base, Joshua Handler noted that the secu-
rity depended on fences with gaping holes. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at
60 (testimony of Joshua Handler, Research Coordinator for Disarmament Issues, Green-
peace).
101. Only 35 to 40 of 140 recently decommissioned submarines have had their fuel re-
moved. Aleksey Yablokov, head of the Russian Security Council's interagency commis-
sion for environmental safety, estimates that removal will cost approximately 1.5 trillion
rubles. See Official on Funds Needed to Dispose of Nuclear Submarines (Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service) Apr. 16, 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-074.
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grouped within approximately forty-five different locations.10 2
The basic problem at each location is inadequate MPC&A, which
is in itself a sufficient window of opportunity for terrorists to ob-
tain fissile material. The ongoing over-accumulation of fissile ma-
terial from both dismantled weapons and fresh production signifi-
cantly magnify these security problems. In turn, the loss of storage
capacity because of the retraction of Russia's borders and the con-
solidation within them of the FSU's entire nuclear arsenal has ex-
acerbated the over-accumulation problem. In the midst of it all, a
plethora of secured slots are available to MOD due to weapons
dismantlement, but MinAtom continues to employ improvised
storage facilities, maintaining a status quo that is intolerable from
a terrorism prevention viewpoint.
2. The MPC&A Deficit in the FSU
The magnitude of the fissile material security problem, and
the variations in it among facilities, prevent a simple description of
its nature. There are, however, sufficient similarities to reveal the
contours of a significant problem.
It is not known how much fissile material has been produced
in the FSU. This is because there has never been, nor is there now,
a system to keep an exact account of fissile material production at
any of these facilities.103 Such accounting, however, is fundamen-
tal for any adequate security measures.
The bedrock of secure custodianship of nuclear weapons
and fissile materials is an effective and meticulous system
of material control and accounting... [this] requires that
an accurate inventory be maintained at all times of the
weights and isotopic content of safeguarded materials.
Such material control and accounting systems provide a
basis for determining whether a theft, diversion, or loss of
material has occurred.104
The consequences of this lack of accounting are not merely
speculative. For example, when the United States removed 600
kilograms of HEU from Kazakhstan in 1994, scientists were
102. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 175, 176 (testimony of Charles B.
Curtis, Deputy Secretary, Dep't of Energy).
103. This almost unbelievable fact is acknowledged by MinAtom. See WMD Hearings
Part II, supra note 18, at 131 (testimony of John F. Sopko).
104. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 37.
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shocked to discover that the cache consisted of four percent more
HEU than expected.10 5 This four percent margin of error pro-
vided sufficient material to build a nuclear weapon.10 6 Even if the
accounting error was only one percent, when applied across the
entire FSU, this would provide adequate material to build nearly a
thousand bombs.
10 7
According to Gosatomnadzor (GAN), a Russian nuclear
regulatory agency, facilities in the Russian civil nuclear industry
typically keep track of their fissile material inventories not by
weight, but by ruble value.108 It is no surprise, then, to learn that
one facility has admitted that its best estimate of its inventory
"could be off by tens of thousands of fuel elements."' 109 Moreover,
at the Kurchatov Institute, the only basis for accounting were
boxes full of "old paper receipts." 110
Furthermore, some facility administrators under-reported
production each year and withheld some fuel elements in order to
compensate for shortfalls in years of lesser production.111 This ex-
acerbates the untrustworthiness of these so-called "accounting"
systems. Although the Russian government recently announced
plans to set up a registry system to account for fissile materials, 112
there is little reason to be optimistic since some Russian officials
continue to believe this to be a U.S. problem rather than their
own.11 3 Even if an effective registration system is implemented,
however, accounting alone cannot prevent theft; it can only reveal
it after the fact. Unfortunately, the preventive aspects of fissile
material security in the FSU is often as inadequate as the account-
ing.
The vast majority of the facilities in question do not contain
adequately sealed containers for the fissile material. In addition,
105. See Weekend Edition: Unguarded Nuclear Material Abounds in Russia, (National
Public Radio, Apr. 20, 1996), available in 1996 WL 7992682 [hereinafter Unguarded Nu-
clear Material]
106. See id.
107. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 38.
108. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 132 (testimony of John F. Sopko).
109. Id
110. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 38.
111. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 132 (testimony of John F. Sopko).
112. See Government Approves proposals on Nuclear Material Security, (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Oct. 23, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-207.
113. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 156 (testimony of Frank Miller,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Int'l Sec. Policy, Dep't of Defense).
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facilities lack fissile material-detecting portal monitors and pe-
rimeter barriers sufficient to repel determined thieves. 1 4 For ex-
ample, the Obninsk laboratory contained pellet-sized pieces of
plutonium in a wax-sealed vault, without guards, cameras," 5 or
portal monitors.'1 6 This problem is not limited to the research
laboratories, however. At one MinAtom facility in Chelyabinsk-
65, a warehouse containing thirty tons of plutonium was secured
only by padlocks on the door,1 7 with completely unsecured win-
dows.11 8 An official report of the Russian government disclosed
that at Tomsk-7, security consisted entirely of guards and barbed
wire fences without any electronic measures capable of defeating
insider theft." 9 Furthermore, Russian Naval facilities lay claim to
the dubious distinction of being the least well-guarded fissile ma-
terial facilities in the entire FSU. The security at Murmansk in-
spired the classic line "even potatoes were guarded better."'1 20
Graham Allison summarizes the Russian nuclear security sys-
tem in the following manner:
The quality of security is generally low: at its best, for
weapons in Ministry of Defense custody, it approaches
U.S. standards, but MinAtom's military fissile material in-
ventory is poorly secured, and its civil plutonium stockpile
is even worse. The security of fissile materials used in re-
search institutes, naval fuel cycle facilities, etc., is nothing
short of terrifying. 12
1
Considering that a Russian officer has admitted that an actual
warhead could be stolen by an insider from his ready launch facil-
ity with relative ease due to consistent electrical outages that de-
114. See idi at 18 (testimony of Harold F. Johnson, Jr.).
115. A total of 50-55 of these elements, which could probably be accumulated by a
single worker dropping the pellets into his pockets over a several week period, would suf-
fice to create a bomb. See id. at 20.
116. See id at 61 (testimony of Joshua Handler).
117. This report comes from the eyewitness testimony of Frank von Hippie, physicist
with the White House Office of Science and Technology. See Nuclear Safety and Security,
supra note 84.
118. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 40.
119. See id
120. This apt description was made by the chief military prosecutor in a case involving
the theft of 10 pounds of HEU from the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk, inspiring
the title Potatoes Were Guarded Better. Burkharin & Potter, supra note 4, at 46; see also
WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 26 (testimony of William C. Potter).
121. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 39.
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activate alarms,122 it is disheartening to consider that abundant
amounts of Pu-239 and U-235 are also available at the lower end
of the security hierarchy. The full scope of the security dilemma,
however, is yet to be revealed.
Although the foregoing discussion dealt exclusively with Rus-
sian nuclear security, it would be a mistake to ignore the signifi-
cance of fissile material in the other states of the FSU. While the
FSU's nuclear weaponry now belongs exclusively to Russia,
123
there are still significant quantities of fissile material, as well as the
capacity to generate more, in the other successor states. Moreo-
ver, there can be no certainty as to how much of this material ex-
ists, nor can there be confidence in the security measures protect-
ing it.124 For example, in 1994, the United States removed 1100
pounds of HEU that Kazakhstan had unexpectedly discovered at a
nuclear facility in Ustkaminigorsk. 125 Then, in 1995, Kazakhstan
notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that an
additional 205 kilograms of HEU had been discovered at the nu-
clear facility in Semipalatinsk. 126 Russia, insisting on ownership
rights, is negotiating a disposition of the material with the United
States, but in the meantime has denied Kazakhstan permission to
apply IAEA safeguards to the site.127
The Semipalatinsk discovery is most significant not as a ma-
terial theft risk, but rather, as a symbol of the potentially numer-
ous unknown caches of fissile material outside of Russia's borders.
Unfortunately, Kazakhstan's importance for proliferation con-
cerns is not limited to the unknown. Aktua, a Caspian Sea port
across the waters from Iran, possesses a fast breeder reactor with
significant amounts of plutonium and a fast-growing Iranian pres-
122. The power outages resulted from a failure to pay the facility's electric bill. The
launch facility possessed 20 SCUD-B nuclear warheads, in addition to numerous nuclear
artillery shells. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 68 (testimony of John F.
Sopko).
123. Belarus returned the last of 81 nuclear missiles to Russia on November 27, 1996;
Ukraine and Kazakhstan had already returned all of the missiles in their possession. See
Belarus Delivers Last Nuke to Russia for Destruction, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov.
28, 1996, at 12A, available in 1996 WL 11508551.
124. According to William Potter, "[tlhere may well be ... substantial caches of nu-
clear material in the non-Russian successor states, about which neither Moscow nor the
national authorities, say in Central Asia or in the Caucuses or in Ukraine or Belarus, may
be familiar with." Unguarded Nuclear Material, supra note 105.
125. See id.
126. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 29 (testimony of William C. Potter).
127. See Unguarded Nuclear Material, supra note 105.
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Ukraine is also a cause for concern, because it inherited an ex-
tensive nuclear reactor network from the FSU, including a large
amount of fissile material. 129 This financially-strapped nation has
not been able to put in place an adequate regulatory structure.
According to Andrei Glukhov, former Deputy Chief of the
Ukrainian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, that agency is understaffed
and overwhelmed. 130 Not surprisingly, although Ukraine has at-
tempted to inventory this material, it has not yet succeeded. 131
As to security, Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko
declared that no theft has taken place since independence. 132
Even if true, this trend is not likely to continue. Former Director
Glukhov described a non-fissile material theft for the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations in the 1996 hearings, indicating
that it took place in one of the more adequately-secured facili-
ties.133 This suggests serious risks of theft at the less-secured re-
search reactors, which do possess HEU.
In Georgia, another unexpected cache of fissile material sur-
faced, under circumstances graphically demonstrating the danger
associated with unknown nuclear stockpiles in unstable locations.
The Georgian cache, consisting of several kilograms of HEU, was
located in an obsolete nuclear reactor outside of Tbilisi, where it
remained completely unguarded throughout the upheavals of the
Georgian civil war. 134 After its discovery, the United States,
Georgia, and Russia began to negotiate its disposition, but these
128. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 30 (testimony of William C. Potter).
129. For example, a one ton cache of enriched uranium at the Kharkov Institute of
Physics and Technology is known to be HEU. See id. at 50 (testimony of Andrei Gluk-
hov, Former Deputy Chief, Ukrainian Nuclear Regulatory Agency).
130. For example, there are only three regulators employed at the agency's headquar-
ters. See id at 51.
131. See id
132. See Minister Rejects Idea of Nuclear Thefts in Ukraine, (Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service, Jan. 31, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-022.
133. The stolen material consisted of two fuel rods (non-liEU), each 3.5 meters long,
which were never recovered. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 50 (testimony
of Andrei Glukhov). Other thefts are known to have been attempted. At Chernobyl,
three workers were caught having stolen 5.5 kilograms of uranium, of unknown enrich-
ment levels. The judge in their case has noted that this was not the first theft attempted
at the facility, and reprimanded the plant for its lax security. See Chernobyl Workers Ar-
rested Trying to Sell 5.5 Kilograms of Uranium, (Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Oct. 26, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-209.
134. See U.S. Trying to Remove Cache of Nuke Material, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEws, Jan. 5, 1997, at 12A, available in 1997 WL 3156324.
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efforts have been "thwarted by months of diplomatic impasse.' 35
Georgian officials have now declared the material for sale, so long
as it is bought with the guarantee that it will not be used for mili-
tary purposes.136 While it is unlikely that this highly visible cache
will be sold to the "wrong" customers, this certainty will not al-
ways be present when the various successors to the Soviet Union
discover secret caches. According to one source, at least seven of
the successor states probably possess fissile material, and only in
Latvia have decent safeguards been put into place. 137 Thus, Rus-
sia does not stand alone in its security shortcomings. Nor should
this be surprising, since the citizens of each of the successor states,
including soldiers and scientists, share the same economic hard-
ships, and it is in significant part the pressure created by these
hardships that both enables and enhances the possibility of fissile
material theft.
3. The Role of Insider Theft
Insider theft is by far the most significant threat to fissile ma-
terial security. 138 While the existing security measures, scant as
they are, suffice to provide relatively significant barriers to a
purely external security threat, the MPC&A failures riddling the
FSU provide a gaping window through which scientists, military
personnel, and lay employees of nuclear material-containing fa-
cilities may pass with ease. These observations were every bit as
true during the peak of Soviet power, but at that time the incentive
structure was entirely different.
The post-Soviet world has produced drastic economic uncer-
tainties, resulting in hardships never experienced by soldiers and
scientists under the old regime. At the same time, the U.S.S.R.'s
harsh but highly effective system of internal control has collapsed,
providing the opportunity for conduct that was previously incon-
ceivable. The problem, from the perspective of fissile material
theft, is that the security measures at Soviet nuclear material fa-
135. Id
136. See Georgia Offers to Sell Highly Enriched Uranium, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-
NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, at 5A, available in 1997 WL 3156662.
137. See Unguarded Nuclear Material, supra note 105. This contrasts with the situation
in Belarus, where officials originally denied possession of fissile material, but later re-
versed themselves, and requested help in securing their cache. See id
138. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18 at 32 (testimony of Sarah Mullen,
Chair, Global Organized Crime Nuclear Black Market Task Force, Ctr. for Strategic and
Int'l Studies).
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cilities were premised on the functioning of that internal control
system. They were simply not designed to protect the material
from insider theft. 139 After all, in Soviet society, a renegade in-
sider would have had nowhere to go.140 There was no access to, or
even awareness of, black market purchasers. Even if there had
been, economic pressures of the magnitude sufficient to compel
such a risk-laden act did not exist. The heart of the matter is that
these premises are inapplicable in the FSU of 1997.
Thus, the greatest risk comes from the FSU's scientists, sol-
diers, and workers who already have access to fissile material. The
only conceivable barrier to diversion by such insiders is a portal
monitor, or similar devices capable of detecting the improper re-
moval of fissile material from restricted areas. Of course, this sort
of safeguard is absent in the at-risk facilities. This is not to suggest
that these insiders are, as a class, given to this type of behavior.
Even the most law-abiding individuals, when confronted with suf-
ficient hardship, such as a starving family, may be pushed across
the line, a step made psychologically palatable by the absolute
ease with which a diversion could be accomplished.
Nuclear scientists in the FSU are drastically underpaid, when
they are paid at all. The "cream of the scientific community"
earns $50 per month, an amount several times lower than that
earned by plumbers, 141 while in some of Russia's closed nuclear
cities, physicists' salaries are less than half of what is paid to a
Moscow bus driver. 142 At the Kurchatov Institute, nuclear scien-
tists earn only $30 per month,143 while Georgian high technology
weapon designers actually subsist on between $2 and $5 per
month.144 The economic and self-esteem problems generated by
these low wage levels are inconsequential, however, compared to
the effects of periodic non-payment of wages.145
139. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 40.
140. See id. at 42.
141. Weekend Edition: International Community Helps Russian Scientists (National
Public Radio, Apr. 1, 1995), available in 1995 WL 2880395.
142. See Morning Edition: Russian "Secret Cities" Look for Peaceful Pursuits
(National Public Radio, Apr. 1, 1995), available in 1995 WL 2880395.
143. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman,
Counsel to the Minority, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, U.S. Senate).
144. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 64 (testimony of Glenn E.
Schweitzer, Dir., Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, National Acad. of Sci., Founding
Dir., Int'l Sci. and Tech. Ctr. in Moscow).
145. See id.
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Wage arrearages are "extremely acute" in the Russian nuclear
industry, 146 with some facilities being as much as four months be-
hind,147 and others providing credit in the place of cash.148 Re-
cently, economic deprivation provoked a nation-wide strike in the
nuclear industry, 149 including a planned hunger strike by hundreds
of employees at a St. Petersburg area nuclear reactor. President
Boris Yeltsin's explicit promise of back pay only partially pre-
empted the strike. 150 There can be no doubt about the magnitude
of the pressures resulting from these tumultuous circumstances.
Vladimir Nechay, the director of a nuclear facility in Chelyabinsk,
committed suicide last fall, leaving a note attributing his decision
to financial stress.151
Another indication of the immense economic pressure and
job frustration afflicting the FSU's scientists is the "brain drain."'1 52
Other nations are courting these experts for their unique knowl-
edge, and some of these experts are only too willing to accept.
"[A]s the economic conditions continue to deteriorate, the hands
of more and more specialists remain id!e for longer and longer pe-
riods of time, and the temptations to turn wherever for economic
relief grows."'1 53 It is not just that the scientists are not paid, even
if the money was there, they have no work to do,154 nor any
equipment with which to do it.155 Worse, the situation deterio-
146. See Nuclear Industry, Power Plant Workers Ready to Strike, (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Sept. 19, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-183.
147. Such is the case at Arzamas-16, for example, where wages lag from two to four
months behind. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 64 (testimony of Glenn E.
Schweitzer).
148. See Nuclear Industry, Power Plant Workers Ready to Strike, supra note 146.
149. See Morning Edition: Russian Workers Strike to Protest Long-Overdue Wages
(National Public Radio, Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Russian Workers Strike], available in
1996 WL 12730096. One striking worker appeared insulted by the suggestion that the fi-
nancial hardships against which he protested might prompt him to steal fissile material for
a black market sale. See id
150. Nine nuclear engineers remained on hunger strike. See Some Progress Reported
in Russia's Labor Strike, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 7, 1996, at A6.
151. The facility's deputy director saw the suicide note before the police took custody
of it. See Chelyabinsk Nuclear Director's Suicide Due to "Stress," (Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service, Oct. 31, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-212.
152. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 139 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
153. See id. at 54 (testimony of Glenn E. Schweitzer).
154. See id. at 145 (testimony of Alan D. Edelman).
155. Labs are often bereft of equipment, which has either been sold or stolen. See id.
at 146 (testimony of John F. Sopko).
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rates each year, as more and more new scientists are produced.
156
Proliferant states are attempting to take full advantage of this
dynamic. Nuclear weapon designers have traveled to China,
157
nuclear physicists have received offers from Iran,158 and missile
guidance experts were stopped on a Russian runway just before
taking off for North Korea. 159 North Korea, Iran, and Iraq re-
cruited nuclear scientists from Uzbekistan, while Georgian and
Kazak nuclear physicists are involved in an Iranian "scientific ex-
change" program. 160 Fortunately, of approximately 60,000 FSU
scientists with WMD knowledge of proliferation concern, the vast
majority are extremely loyal to their countries, 161 and have little
interest in permanent emigration. 162 Still, the real world conse-
quences of financial pressures cannot be ignored. Investigators for
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations discovered a flyer
being circulated in the Middle East that proclaimed the availability
of "detailed files" on FSU nuclear weapons experts seeking
"reasonable pay." 163
From an economic perspective, life in the military is no better
than in the nuclear industry. Since 1992, Russian military spending
has declined by nearly half,164 and wage arrearages have become
common.165 Significantly, General Maslin, head of the 12th Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, recently revealed that the
salaries of soldiers in charge of nuclear weapons have not been
paid in one or two months. 166 The overall situation has led the
Russian Defense Minister to declare the military in a "state of
emergency."' 167 In addition, former Russian Security Council
Chief Alexander Lebed has warned that the army is in "a condi-
156. See id. at 144 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
157. See id. at 53 (testimony of Glenn E. Schweitzer).
158. See id at 65.
159. These scientists had the approval of their laboratories, and were being offered
$25,000 a year. Apparently, previous information exchanges with the North Koreans had
already taken place. See id. at 66.
160. See id. at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
161. See id at 53 (testimony of Glenn E. Schweitzer).
162. See id at 145 (testimony of John F. Sopko).
163. The "Hong Kong Sunshine Industrial Company," an illegal arms-sale group, cir-
culated the flyer. See id at 139 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
164. See Strategic Survey: US Military Strongest, Russia's in Decline, B. GLOBE, Oct.
10, 1996, at A13.
165. See Russian Workers Strike, supra note 149.
166. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
167. See Russian Workers Strike, supra note 149.
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tion very much like the condition before [a] mutiny. ' 168
Low or non-existent wages have driven some soldiers, like
those of the Kantemirov Tank Division, to farm for cabbage and
turnips in the fields.169 Others are less fortunate; involvement in
the black market sale of weaponry has become common from top
to bottom in the military.170 In one instance, two soldiers lost their
lives while attempting to dismantle a live nuclear warhead in order
to sell its parts on the scrap metal black market.171 Other soldiers,
like Director Nechay, have taken their own lives in response to
their economic plight.172
It is not difficult to imagine a hungry scientist or soldier
agreeing to take a small quantity of fissile material out of a facility
to which that person already has access because that person is bur-
dened by a crushing sense of despair and frustration for failing to
support a family. In many facilities, there are no internal safe-
guards to prevent the theft, nor any accounting system to discover
that it had taken place. 173 Guards on the outside would most
likely just nod their heads at the familiar sight of the insider enter-
ing and leaving the facility, unaware that fissile material filled that
person's pockets. In the post-Soviet world, the disincentives to
theft are simply gone, replaced by frustration and need. These
conditions suggest that the only true hurdles for a would-be nu-
clear terrorist are identifying, contacting, and reaching an agree-
ment with those who have access to fissile material and are des-
perate enough to help.
4. The Additional Problem of Border Security
Mere possession of fissile material is not sufficient, however,
to accomplish the aims of a would-be nuclear terrorist. Obviously,
in order to pose a serious risk beyond the FSU, fissile material
must be moved across the FSU's borders. This raises questions
concerning border security in the FSU; if policy makers can rely on
border controls, then there is much less cause for alarm concerning
168. Lebed Says Russian Army Near Collapse, ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE,
Nov. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12392110.
169. See Lebed Warns of Military Uprisings; Kremlin's Security Chief Steps Into Power
Vacuum, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 26, 1996, at A16 [hereinafter Lebed Warns of Military
Uprisings].
170. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
171. See Lebed Warns of Military Uprising, supra note 169.
172. See id
173. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 40.
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internal security matters. 174 Unfortunately, border security in the
FSU does not, and cannot, provide such a guarantee.
175
Illegal exportation is a significant problem in the FSU.
176
Currently in Russia, there is no comprehensive export control
law,177 although the country has joined major international export
control treaties, such as the Missile Technology Control Re-
gime. 178 The Russian government does have a patchwork of ex-
port-related decrees, but at least some Russian courts have refused
to apply criminal sanctions for violations of rules not passed by the
Duma.179 Although the ranks of customs officials have recently
begun to swell, it is probable that this is more a reflection of the
lucrative opportunities open to corrupt customs officials than it is
of a growing emphasis on effective border controls. 180 In light of
the involvement of various Russian and Ukrainian officials in the
export of sensitive missile technologies, 181 and the conviction of
Kazakhstan's former Defense Minister for a $2 million arms
sale, 182 it is difficult to argue that a genuine top-level commitment
to tighten border controls exists.183
Even if such a commitment existed, however, the ultimate re-
sult is that only a fraction of illegal exports would ever be inter-
dicted.184 Those who cannot export legally always have the option
of smuggling their goods across the border, and in the FSU, the
border is more than 40,000 miles long.185 The western portions of
that border lead on to the well-policed states of Europe. A far
larger stretch of border, however, runs through the Caucuses and
174. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
175. See id
176. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 36-37 (testimony of Gary Bertsch,
Dir., Ctr. for Int'l Trade and Sec., Univ. of Georgia).
177. See id at 36.
178. See All Things Considered: Yeltsin Fires Three Top Officials Linked to Chechen
War (National Public Radio, June 30, 1995), available in 1995 WL 2918636.
179. See WMD Hearings Part I1, supra note 18, at 36-37 (testimony of Gary Bertsch).
180. The more positive spin on this development was put forth by Gary Bertsch in tes-
timony before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, but it was rejected by William
Potter, whose interpretation appears more plausible in light of continued financial strains
in the FSU. See id at 40 (testimony of William C. Potter).
181. See id at 42.
182. See id at 38 (testimony of Gary Bertsch).
183. See id at 42 (testimony of William C. Potter).
184. See id This is a fact also well known to those involved in combating international
narcotics.
185. See id at 37 (testimony of Gary Bertsch).
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Central Asia, referred to as the "southern tier. ' 186 The southern
tier smuggling route would be both shorter and safer, and
"[d]espite difficult terrain, a direct overland route [to the south]
could avoid Western detection altogether. ' 187 Smugglers traveling
to the Azerbaijan-Iran border would discover few, if any, border
guards, with the same situation pertaining in the other southern
tier states.188 Nor would the presence of a border guard necessar-
ily be a problem; in Turkmenistan, for example, a bottle of vodka
suffices to wave a person through, and $100 will clear the path for
an entire vehicle. 189 Bribery, however, may not even be necessary.
Russia's many border posts and points of entry lack even
the most rudimentary equipment for detecting nuclear
materials, and the underpaid officials who staff these posts
have received no special training in the identification and
detection of nuclear materials. (This is also true, it should
be noted, of the U.S. Customs Service.) The situation in
the other former Soviet republics is even worse: not only
do they lack trained officials and special detection equip-
ment, but as new states they also generally have inade-
quate export control laws and regulations .... 190
Compounding the problem, the U.S. intelligence and law en-
forcement communities have access to very little information in
the southern tier.191 The CIA, however, is developing a working
group to address this potentially-disastrous shortcoming. 192 In
light of the foregoing, it appears quite certain that fissile material
is both vulnerable to theft and amenable to smuggling. But, mere
availability, without more, does not suffice to establish the exis-
tence of a black market.
186. See itd at 137 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
187. Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window-A Legal
Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 75 U. ILL. L. REv. 667, 677 (1996).
188. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 137 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
189. See id at 138.
190. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 94.
191. See WMD Hearings Part I1, supra note 18, at 32 (testimony of Sarah Mullen).
192. See id. at 172 (testimony of Gordon C. Oehler, Dir., Non-Proliferation Ctr., CIA).
Then CIA Director John Deutch, when asked by Senator Nunn about U.S. intelligence
capacities in the southern tier, declined to comment in open session. See id. at 77
(testimony of John Deutch).
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B. The Demand for Fissile Material
1. Demand at the Terrorist Organization Level
An available supply of fissile material poses little risk to the
United States if there is no demand for it. In the past, so long as
terrorists were not actively interested in WMDs there was no
special reason to guard against terrorists' acquisition of the precur-
sors of WMD capability. But it is impossible to deny that at least
some terrorists now desire such weapons. The Aum Shinrikyo cult
is perceived to have pioneered terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction with their sarin gas assault on the Tokyo subways in
1995.193 In fact, the cult had already conducted a smaller-scale sa-
rin attack in 1994, in Matsumoto, Japan.194 Nor is the United
States immune from the new threat. In 1995, members of an ex-
tremist right-wing organization were convicted of planning to use
ricin, a biological weapon, against federal officials. 195 In another
incident, a white supremacist was arrested for purchasing three
vials of bubonic plague. 196
There is no reason to believe that terrorists willing to resort to
chemical and biological weapons would not also employ nuclear
weaponry if available. 197 The Aum Shinrikyo cult, for example,
has explored the nuclear option. Not surprisingly, the cult looked
to the FSU to fulfill this purpose, viewing it as "a supermarket for
technology, equipment and expertise."'1 98 Moreover, the notes of
Aum Shinrikyo's "Construction Minister" revealed that at a
meeting with unidentified officials, the price for an actual nuclear
weapon may have been discussed. 199 Another example occurred
in 1995, when Chechen rebels managed to place a 30 pound back-
pack containing cesium-137 200 in Izmailovsky Park in Moscow. 2 01
The rebels did not attempt to disperse the radioactive material, but
193. See Jessica Stern, Terrorism Multiplied, WASH. POST, July 17, 1996, at A19.
194. See WMD Hearings Part I, supra note 8, at 23 (testimony of John Sopko).
195. See Stern, supra note 193.
196. See id.; see also Schumer, supra note 8, at 2.
197. See generally, Laqueur, supra note 16. Former CIA Director John Deutch has
pointed out that the nuclear option is the least likely WMD route for a terrorist, with
chemical weaponry being the most likely. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 75
(testimony of John Deutch).
198. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 15 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
199. See id at 16.
200. See id at 69, 70 (comments of Senator Richard Lugar).
201. See id at 58 (testimony of Joshua Handler).
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were instead content to convey a message of credibility to the
Russian government. 20 2 The overall tenor of these incidents con-
vey an additional message: at least some terrorists will go to sig-
nificant lengths to acquire a nuclear option.
2. Demand at the State Sponsor Level
The evidence of demand for fissile material by potential state
sponsors of terrorism is even more compelling. Iraq is a good ex-
ample. According to former Director of Central Intelligence John
Deutch, Iraq has explored the possibility of purchasing illicit fissile
material as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons capacity.
20 3
This should not be a surprise considering the expense Baghdad has
incurred in both its pre-war domestic fissile material production
program and its post-war efforts to maintain a residual WMD ca-
pacity.20 4 Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq was engaged in a crash pro-
gram to develop at least one nuclear device, deliverable by SCUD
missile.20 5 For over ten years, 15,000 Iraqi's were involved in the
$10 billion dollar program,20 6 which went into overdrive in 1990.207
Had the war not intervened, Iraq would have possessed an actual
nuclear weapon by the end of 1991.208
Since the war's end, Iraq has refused to cooperate with the
U.N. Special Commission, which is responsible for identifying and
destroying Iraq's WMD capacity.209 Due in part to Iraq's resis-
tance, U.N. sanctions, such as the oil embargo, have continued to
strangle the Iraqi economy, costing Iraq $75 billion over a five year
period.210 It is the consensus of the intelligence community that
the Hussein regime is committed to preserving residual WMD ca-
pacity despite these consequences. 21'
202. See id at 69, 70 (comments of Senator Richard Lugar).
203. See id at 74 (testimony of John Deutch).
204. See generally id at 90-104 (testimony of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus).
205. See id. at 91.
206. See id at 105 (testimony of David A. Kay, Senior Vice President, Hicks & As-
socs.). Amazingly, 19 of 25 facilities involved in this program were unknown prior to the
Gulf War. See id
207. See id at 98 (testimony of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus). The Iraqis were fabricating
an implosion device. See id
208. See id. at 105 (testimony of David A. Kay).
209. See id at 90 (testimony of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus).
210. See id at 91.
211. See id at 79 (testimony of John Deutch); see also National Security Hearing, supra
note 57 (testimony of Toby T. Gati).
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In light of the close scrutiny already being applied to Iraq,
however, there may be more need to focus on Iran. There is con-
siderable concern that Iran is currently engaged in an indigenous
program of fissile material development, 212 similar to the program
attempted by Iraq.213 Iran is already oriented towards the FSU in
its pursuit of indigenous production capacity. For example, Iran
negotiated the purchase of a reactor from Russia,214 made numer-
ous efforts to recruit the assistance of nuclear experts from the
various states of the FSU, including Georgia,215 Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan,216 and it may even be sending its own scientists to
Russia for training.217 In 1995, then-Secretary of Defense William
Perry warned that Iran will have nuclear weapons capacity within
seven to fifteen years.218
As in the case of Iraq, it is difficult to persuasively argue that
a country willing to engage in expensive, time-consuming pro-
grams of covert indigenous fissile material development would not
enthusiastically avail itself of relatively inexpensive and readily
available black market fissile material. In fact, it is known that
Iran was interested in purchasing the HEU that the United States
eventually removed from Kazakhstan in Project Sapphire.219 This
is significant from a terrorism prevention perspective because the
connection between Iran and state-sponsorship of terrorism is
well-established: "Iran remains foremost among the states which
sponsor terrorism. '' 220 Unfortunately for the United States, the
government of Iran considers the U.S. to be its "principal global
212. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 74 (testimony of John Deutch).
213. See id. at 113 (testimony of Gary Milhollin, Dir., Wis. Project on Nuclear Arms
Control).
214. A light water reactor in Bushehr is due to be completed by the year 2000, at a
cost of $780 million. A second reactor purchase, for southern Iran, is also under consid-
eration. See Government to Increase Defense Supplies to Iran, (Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service, February 14, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-032; see also Mikhaylov: Russia May
Train Iranian Nuclear Specialists, (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 6, 1996)
FBIS-SOV-96-046; Charles J. Ball, A Weapons Policy Like An Old Sieve, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 1996, at A23.
215. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 65 (testimony of Glenn E.
Schweitzer).
216. See id. at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
217. See Mikhaylov: Russia May Train Iranian Nuclear Specialists, supra note 214.
218. See Peter Waldman, Egypt Confronts Israel on Nuclear Arms; Pressure to Sign
Non-Proliferation Pact Strains Ties, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995, at A10.
219. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 44.
220. National Security Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Toby T. Gati).
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adversary." 221 The threat was symbolically captured recently by
Iran's own parliament, which celebrated passage of an $8.3 million
fund to fight "U.S. government plots against Iran" with 270 legisla-
tors rising to their feet and chanting "Death to America! ,
222
The focus on Iraq and Iran is not meant to imply that other
countries are not involved in, or capable of, nuclear proliferation.
North Korea 223 and China 224 have each demonstrated a willing-
ness to contribute to the spread of fissile material production tech-
nology without regard to the recipient.225 However, it is important
to note that the Department of Energy predicts that rising world
oil demand will infuse an additional $1 trillion into the economies
of the Middle East's oil-producing nations by 2010.226
The demand side of the potential nuclear black market has
thus taken on the following dimensions. Terrorist groups are in-
creasingly willing to use weapons of mass destruction, and they are
willing to use them against the United States. 227 Even if a willing
terrorist group is either financially or logistically unable to directly
access the fissile material supply of the FSU, potential state spon-
sors may be able to overcome this obstacle for them. 228 Several
states have already demonstrated that it is worth billions of dollars,
as well as international approbation, to pursue their own fissile
material production capacity. 229 These states will logically turn to
the black market in order to save both time and money. Any of
these states, if willing to sponsor terrorism, could provide the nec-
essary connection between a willing terrorist group otherwise
lacking access to the fissile material market. Thus, although fissile
material demand should, as a matter of anti-terrorism policy de-
221. Id.
222. Iranian Parliament OK's Anti-U.S. Fund, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 23,
1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL 3158322.
223. See National Security Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Toby T. Gati); see also
WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 66 (testimony of Glenn E. Schweitzer).
224. Gary Milhollin reports that China has sold nuclear-related technology to Algeria,
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 111; see also
A.M. Rosenthal, The Nuclear Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996, at A39.
225. See National Security Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Toby T. Gati).
226. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 161 (testimony of Charles B. Cur-
tis).
227. See Schumer, supra note 8 at 2.
228. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 91 (testimony of Ambassador Rolf
Ekeus).
229. See id. at 79 (testimony of John Deutch).
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velopment, be assumed in this analysis,230 there are in fact abun-
dant reasons to believe that this demand does or soon will exist.
C. The Black Market in Practice: Incidents of Fissile Material
Smuggling
In light of the supply of available fissile material and the like-
lihood of demand for it, it is not surprising that a nascent nuclear
black market has already begun to reveal itself.231 A series of
chilling, but verified, incidents have combined with an ocean of in-
vestigations and rumors to give flesh to the black market. A flood
of fissile material smuggling investigations have been conducted in
Europe over the past six years, particularly in Germany. In 1990,
only four such investigations took place; by 1992, the total grew to
158, and then to 241 in 1993.232 By 1994, the total number of in-
vestigations over the preceding three years exceeded 700.233 It
does appear that many of these cases were not actual proliferation
threats234 as some involved false claims of fissile material posses-
sion or access.235 Not all of these incidents, however, fall into the
false alarm category. At least sixty seizures of nuclear materials
took place between 1994 and 1996.236 In at least seven of these
cases, weapons-usable U-235 and Pu-239 were involved.237 These
incidents provide indisputable evidence that the gaps in the FSU
fissile material security system pose more than a theoretical dan-
ger. Rather, these gaps provide a real opportunity for would-be
nuclear terrorists to surmount the only substantial obstacle to the
creation of a nuclear device.
230. It would be a poor attempt at a prevention strategy that relied on the terrorists
themselves not to choose a particular means to achieve their ends. There is always the
possibility, however remote, that a particular means will be employed; where, as here, the
harm associated with that means is of significant magnitude, it becomes well worth the
effort of developing and implementing an effective prevention strategy, so long as there is
any reasonable possibility that the uncertain, the unthinkable, will occur.
231. See Mirsky, supra note 5, at 751.
232. See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 187, at 671.
233. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 70 (comments of Senator Richard
Lugar).
234. See id
235. See id at 25-29 (testimony of William C. Potter).
236. See id.
237. See id
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1. Established Incidents
The first well-established case of fissile material smuggling,
occurring in 1992, graphically demonstrated the insider-theft risk
and its economic antecedents.238 Leonid Smirnov, a chemical en-
gineer at the Luch Scientific Production Association near Moscow,
spent five months gradually accumulating approximately 1.5 kilo-
grams of HEU.239 Inspired by a newspaper article discussing the
money to be made on the nuclear black market,24 ° Smirnov suc-
ceeded on over twenty separate occasions in walking out of Luch
with a fifty to seventy gram jar full of HEU (ninety percent en-
riched), 241 which he then added to a growing cache in a glass jar on
his balcony.242 Smirnov eventually attempted to take the HEU to
Moscow in search of a buyer, but was arrested prior to his depar-
ture.243 This law enforcement victory, however, was short-lived.
Smirnov was sentenced only to probation. 244
Within a year, another HEU theft occurred, this time drawing
on fissile material from the Russian naval fuel cycle, demonstrat-
ing the potential role of military personnel. In July, 1993, two
Russian Navy servicemen successfully stole 1.8 kilograms of ura-
nium (enriched to the thirty-five percent level) from reactor as-
semblies stored at a North Fleet Naval base near the Norwegian
border.245 These men were captured and convicted, but again, the
sentences imposed bore little relation to the seriousness of the
crime: four and five years respectively. 246 The servicemen had in-
sisted that they were acting on the orders of their superiors, but
their superiors were found not guilty.247 In an ominous twist, a
possible connection between the theft and a Murmansk-St. Peters-
burg organized crime group has fueled an ongoing investigation. 248
238. See id
239. See id.
240. See id
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See Lou Kilzer & Ann Imse, The New Nuclear Threat; Economic Pressures Hin-
der U.S. Efforts to Secure Loosely Guarded Russian Stockpiles, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Sept. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12347382.
245. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 26 (testimony of William C. Potter)
246. See id.
247. See id
248. See id
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A second naval fuel incident occurred only a few months
later, at the Sevmorput shipyard outside Murmansk. 249 The theft
was committed by Russian Navy Captain Alexei Tikhomirov, who
was briefed on the scant security measures by his own brother, the
shipyard's civilian chief of refueling.250 Reactor fuel at Sevmorput
was kept in a building secured only by a padlock and a perimeter
fence with gaping holes. 251 The shipyard itself was fenced in, but
several gates were unguarded. Slipping easily into the building,
Tikhomirov took ten pounds worth of twenty percent enriched
uranium. If he had not left the door open when he left, no one
would have known of the theft. Fortunately, when the thieves at-
tempted to sell their cache the next year, for $50,000, they were ar-
rested.252
In 1994, the proliferation problem took on a new dimension.
Confirmed cases of theft no longer included only in-country diver-
sions. For the first time, it was known that stolen fissile material
was being successfully smuggled across borders. In a purely acci-
dental discovery in May of 1994, German police in Tengen,
Bavaria discovered a vial containing 5.6 grams of nearly pure Pu-
239.253 Police searching the home of Adolf Jakle found the mate-
rial in the course of an unrelated counterfeiting investigation. It is
possible that a Bulgarian organized crime group was linked to this
incident.254
Central Europe continues to be a fertile locale for fissile ma-
terial smuggling incidents. Only a few months after the Tengen
seizure, German police conducted a sting operation in Laundshut,
Bavaria that netted 800 milligrams of HEU (87.5%).255 Then, in
December of 1994, officers in Prague seized 2.72 kilograms (6
pounds) of Russian HEU (87.5%).256 The latter seizure resulted
from an anonymous phone tip that directed police to a parked car
containing the HEU.257 In addition, a Czech, a Belarussian, and a
Ukrainian, all with nuclear industry backgrounds, were arrested
249. See id
250. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 25.
251. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 26 (testimony of William C. Potter).
252. See id. at 27.
253. See id at 26-27.
254. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 25-26.
255. See itt
256. The material was brought into the Czech Republic by train from Russia. See
WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 136 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
257. See id.
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while sitting in the car. The Czech defendant in this case claimed
that his Russian source was willing to provide up to forty kilo-
grams of HEU in the near future, and eventually would provide up
to one ton.258
Rounding out this survey of well-established fissile material
thefts is a controversial incident that occurred at the Munich air-
port in August of 1994. Undercover German police had previously
met with a suspected smuggler who had sold them a small sample
of plutonium.259 Then, in August, the smuggler and his accom-
plice boarded a commercial Lufthansa flight in Moscow, checking
a suitcase containing nearly one pound of Pu-239 (363 grams).
The police arrested both men and a third individual who met them
at the airport.260 The smugglers were to provide eleven pounds of
plutonium under the original deal, but their inability to raise suffi-
cient cash to purchase that much from their Russian source forced
the smugglers to provide the smaller amount.261
This last incident has provoked serious friction between Ger-
many and Russia, as well as within Germany itself. When Bavar-
ian officials admitted that they knew prior to the flight's departure
that the fissile material was on board, they were criticized in Ger-
many for risking public safety in order to stage a dramatic law en-
forcement and intelligence "success" in Germany.262 Some Rus-
sian officials picked up on this theme, arguing that German sting
operations, and not FSU fissile material security shortfalls, are re-
sponsible for fissile material leakage.263 Furthermore, despite an
early acknowledgment by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
that the Munich material was from the Obninsk research facil-
ity,264 MinAtom has subsequently denied the loss of any mate-
rial.265 This reversal happens to make the argument that German
security agencies are manufacturing the "leakage" in order to
258. See it at 136 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
259. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 26.
260. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 27 (testimony of William C. Potter).
261. One of the smugglers apparently sold his own car to finance the initial delivery.
See it at 136-37 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
262. See Back From Hades: Germany, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 1995, at 59, available
in 1995 WL 9568934.
263. See U.S. Report on Nuclear Trafficking Scored, (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Sept. 12, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-210-S.
264. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 27 (testimony of William C. Potter).
265. See Russia Says It Can Account For All Nuclear Materials (National Public Radio,
Aug. 23, 1994), available in 1994 WL 8690990.
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score political points at home more plausible, of course. 266 The
Bundestag has formed a formal committee of inquiry to investigate
this matter.267 A conclusion that German stings have somehow
contributed to fissile material smuggling would not, however, ex-
plain away the weapons-grade Pu-239 discovered by pure fortune
in Adolf Jakle's garage.268 Rather, this only tends to suggest that
aside from sting operations, European law enforcement is largely
unable to identify or impede the nascent fissile material black
market.
2. Suspected and Related Incidents
In addition to the seven confirmed incidents, there have been
several incidents which either lack the same indicia of reliability,
or only indirectly concern fissile material, but are still of significant
concern. For example, in a widely-reported investigation, Lithua-
nian police discovered a large amount of beryllium, and some be-
ryllium-uranium alloy, in the basement of a Vilnius bank.269 Be-
ryllium has significant uses in nuclear weapon design.270
In another incident, 3.05 kilograms of HEU, stolen from the
Electrostal facility near Moscow, may have been discovered in St.
Petersburg in June of 1994.271 In 1995, there may have been a di-
version of a small amount of plutonium from Electrostal. 272
Though the material was never recovered, this incident is most
significant as a revelation that there is plutonium at Electrostal at
all.273 Also in 1995, six kilograms of stolen twenty percent U-235
may have been found in Kiev, Ukraine.274 This seizure involved
two former Russian soldiers, and was perhaps the fourth in a series
of Ukrainian HEU seizures. 275 In October of 1996, Lithuanian
police recovered 10 kilograms from a 100 kilogram uranium cache
266. See U.S. Report on Nuclear Trafficking Scored, supra note 263.
267. See Back From Hades: Germany, supra note 262.
268. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 27 (testimony of William C. Potter).
269. See id
270. For example, a simple design might employ beryllium, which emits neutrons when
stimulated by alpha particles, as the "trigger" for the nuclear explosion. See Fissile Mate-
rial Primer, supra note 25, at 212.
271. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 28 (testimony of William C. Potter).
272. See id
273. See id
274. See id
275. See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 187, at 672-73.
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which had been stolen from a local nuclear reactor in 1992.276 In
addition, teenagers in Moscow, on a prank, have actually been able
to enter an HEU-containing facility through an unalarmed win-
dow.277
These reports are legion, but they may in fact be most signifi-
cant for what they do not include. In general, smuggling activities,
by their nature covert, defy discovery. Thus, "inferring the magni-
tude of the flow or the intentions of the actors from the small slice
of the known picture very likely is misleading. ' 278 This is particu-
larly true in the case of FSU fissile material because with a few ex-
ceptions, reports of smuggling activity in the "southern tier" of the
FSU do not exist. In light of the greater likelihood of success for
smugglers who choose the southern route, this is a disturbing but
perhaps inevitable development. 279 It is virtually certain that the
lack of smuggling reports from outside the European theater
"represents an information gap rather than a lack of illicit activ-
ity."280
3. The Potential Role of Organized Crime
These reports of smuggling do not contain more than an oc-
casional suggestion of the involvement of organized crime. In fact,
"to date, there have been no cases in which a definitive proof of
organized crime involvement exists. ' 281 Rather, the known and
alleged smuggling incidents overwhelmingly tend to involve either
relatively inconsequential "flim-flam artists" peddling non-fissile
materials, 282 or, in the more serious cases, amateurs with inside ac-
cess but without the criminal sophistication of organized crime.283
If organized crime does become involved, however, "the nuclear
black market threat would increase dramatically" as "far-flung in-
276. It is important to note that the small portion of uranium recovered left nearly 90
kilograms unrecovered. See Police Find Some of Nuclear Fuel Stolen From Ignalina,
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Oct. 31, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-212.
277. See Hoffman, supra note 86.
278. Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 187, at 677.
279. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 137 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
280. Id. at 32 (testimony of Sarah Mullen).
281. Id. at 151 (testimony of Robert M. Blitzer, Section Chief, Domestic Terror-
ism/Counterterrorism, FBI).
282. Id at 151 (testimony of Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, Dep't of State).
283. See iU at 165.
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ternational connections" come into play.284
It appears that organized crime is already involved in sub-
fissile material level nuclear-related crime, but experts disagree as
to whether criminal organizations will take the next step.285 But,
to the degree that organized crime in Russia has become an inte-
gral part of the fabric of economic life,286 it may be inevitable that
these criminal networks will join and lend structure, reach, and
capital to the budding market.
The United States has been fortunate so far. According to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), "[t]o date, there have been
no known instances of nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materi-
als being illegally brought into or purchased in the U.S.' ' 287 The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) adds that to the best of its
knowledge, no weapons-grade material has yet been smuggled to
any terrorist group or rogue nation. 288 These hopeful assurances,
however, are neither iron-clad nor guaranteed against changing
circumstances, and it would be a mistake to completely rely on
these assumptions in the face of our current knowledge.
The foregoing analysis identifies the elements necessary for a
terrorist group to develop a nuclear weapon. The knowledge is in
the open literature. The funding requirements are reasonable.
The intangibles can be confidently assumed. Fissile material rep-
resents the only necessary element subject to any useful degree of
reasonable preventive disruption. But the former Soviet Union
contains a massive supply of fissile material under inadequate lock
and key, in the custody of individuals subject to tidal economic
forces. Through a broken lens, trained only on the less likely of
the possible smuggling routes, we can already observe abundant
evidence that this supply is being offered in black market fashion;
we can only speculate as to the true magnitude of the worldwide
market for fissile material.
Each day, terrorists and their state sponsors are more likely to
learn of this opportunity. More likely to seek it out. More likely
to make the necessary connection with an insider. More likely to
meet the sole effective criterion for membership in that most ex-
284. Id. at 33.
285. See id at 32.
286. See Mirsky, supra note 5, at 749.
287. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 165 (testimony of Robert M. Blit-
zer).
288. See id at 173 (testimony of Gordon C. Oehler).
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clusive of circles, the nuclear weapon powers.
It is beyond rational debate that the national security of the
United States demands an immediate and comprehensive response
to this state of affairs. The situation could not be more critical, de-
spite public perceptions to the contrary.289 The existing U.S. re-
sponse must be measured in light of this sense of urgency.
IV. U.S. RESPONSE To THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The United States has attempted to prevent the emergence of
a nuclear black market with an array of measures, each with its
own particular advantages and limitations. The overall U.S.
"program" was closely analyzed by the Senate's Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations in March of 1996,290 revealing a con-
sensus that existing U.S. efforts were neither proceeding fast
enough, nor far enough, to adequately address the problem.291
This effect, spearheaded by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam
Nunn, identified specific and significant flaws in the U.S. pro-
gram.292 However, the fundamental barrier preventing the U.S.
response from reaching a level commensurate with the true scope
of the national security risk is the lack of political impetus, and this
cannot be addressed by legislation alone.293 Rather, the power of
the Presidency is needed to effectively communicate the danger to
the public at large.294 Broad appreciation of the danger would
generate the political conditions in Congress necessary for passage
of legislation on a significantly greater scale than is currently pos-
sible. Of course, in the absence of these measures, it is possible
that political pressure will be generated anyway. For example,
there would be no shortage of legislative willpower the morning
after the detonation of a crude nuclear device in lower Manhattan.
289. See id. at 24 (testimony of Graham T. Allison).
290. See generally WMD Hearings Part 1, supra note 8; WMD Hearings Part II, supra
note 18.
291. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18.
292. See idi
293. See id
294. See itt
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A. A Piecemeal Approach, Slowly Refined
Existing programs intended to prevent the formation of a
black market in fissile material are a subset of the overall U.S.
counter-proliferation effort. These programs can be grouped into
the following loose categories: stanching the flow of fissile mate-
rial from facilities in the FSU; enhancing border security.at home
and abroad; bringing intelligence and law enforcement to bear; in-
creasing the economic well-being of the FSU's scientists; and di-
rectly acquiring and disposing of the FSU's fissile material. 295 This
multi-front approach has been implemented through several dif-
ferent agencies, with an uncertain degree of coordination and vari-
able degrees of success. "Unfortunately, so far U.S. policies and
programs have not produced a dramatic reduction in the risk of
nuclear leakage ... at the current rate of progress, substantial risk
of nuclear leakage will persist for years to come. ' 296
1. Stanching the Flow of Fissile Material
Until 1996, the U.S. employed a two-track strategy to address
the core problem of poor fissile material security in the FSU: gov-
ernment-to-government diplomacy, combined with lab-to-lab
agreements between American nuclear weapons labs and their
counterparts in the FSU.297 The first track, conducted at the gov-
ernment-to-government level, involves a series of specific agree-
ments with the governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus. 298  The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro-
gram,299 which was the basis for U.S. funding of FSU disarmament
programs, also funded these efforts, with the Department of De-
fense as the executive agent.300
Government-to-government programs have not had a success-
ful history.301 The first project was an MPC&A upgrade at Elec-
295. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 79-80.
296. IL at 74.
297. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 18 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson,
Jr.).
298. See generally Jack M. Beard, A New Legal Regime for Bilateral Assistance Pro-
grams: International Agreements Governing the "Nunn-Lugar" Demilitarization Program
in the Former Soviet Union, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 895, 900 (1995).
299. The CrR program is also known as "Nunn-Lugar." See id
300. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 18 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson,
Jr.).
301. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 83.
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trostal, but the upgrades were applied only to low-enrichment
uranium production. This $10 million expenditure had negligible
counter-proliferation impact.302 The next project was intended to
upgrade MPC&A at Sverdlovsk, but MinAtom's refusal to coop-
erate at that location led instead to a series of alternate upgrades
at Electrostal (HEU production), Mayak, and Obninsk.303 MinA-
tom stalled even these projects until, coincidentally, an unrelated
financial dispute was settled.304 The government-to-government
approach, requiring prolonged, frustrating negotiations with re-
peated delays and obstructions, was soon perceived as inadequate
for the task at hand.305
The failure of the government-to-government approach can
be traced to several problems. First, MinAtom has been extremely
uncooperative in many instances, 306 reflecting efforts to preserve
MinAtom's institutional interest in promoting the Russian nuclear
industry, 307 distrust of the United States,308 and dissatisfaction
with the terms of the proposed agreements.309 Second, the use of
the Department of Defense as the executive agency imported strict
auditing and examination requirements for the use of CTR funds
that contributed to Russian suspicions of American motives, and
thereby decreased the range of installations that the Russians
would allow to participate.310 Third, the routing of funds through
the Department of Defense also imported purchasing and spend-
ing requirements that forced program funds to be spent at home,
rather than in Russia. 311 Although this gave the program the do-
mestic political palatability of a boondoggle, it also had two unfor-
302. See id
303. See idZ at 81.
304. See id. at 82.
305. See id.
306. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 151 (testimony of Thomas E.
McNamara), 19 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson, Jr.).
307. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 24.
308. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 156 (testimony of Frank Miller); see
also Morning Edition:t Nuclear Safety and Security in Russia, Part 3 (National Public Ra-
dio, Apr. 18, 1996), available in 1996 WL 2814508.
309. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 19 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson,
Jr.).
310. See id.
311. See id.; see also ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 82-83. In fact, under CTR,
funds cannot be directly transferred. Misuse of funds is thought to be prevented by pro-
viding only for the transfer of equipment and services. See Beard, supra note 298, at 908-
09.
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tunate consequences: it decreased the political acceptability of the
program on the Russian end, while at the same time missing an
opportunity to increase Russia's indigenous MPC&A capacity. To
avoid these problems, the Department of Energy now administers
CTR funds, instead of the Department of Defense.
312
The Department of Energy has been in charge of the second
track of American MPC&A strategy, the lab-to-lab program, all
along. These efforts involve cooperation between American nu-
clear weapons labs, such as Los Alamos, and their counterparts in
the FSU. From the beginning, the lab-to-lab approach has been
more successful than the government-to-government approach, in
terms of both speed and coverage.313 For example, with lab-to-lab
funding administered by Energy, the Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore laboratories have cooperated with Obninsk's Institute
of Physics in creating a real time fissile material tracking system,314
MPC&A at Kurchatov has been vastly improved, and an indige-
nous MPC&A system has been devised at Arzamas-16. 315
The lab-to-lab approach is thought to work because it is
"politically savvy, ' 316 whereas the Defense-funded programs re-
quired equipment to be purchased from American suppliers. The
lab-to-lab program encourages the purchase of Russian goods and
services, bolstering Russian political support for participation in
the program.317 Similarly, the lack of stringent audit-and-exam
requirements decreases Russian suspicions of American "spying,"
allowing the participation of a greater number of facilities. 318 In
short, lab-to-lab succeeds because the general tenor of the De-
partment of Energy approach is to convince the Russians that
these programs are in fact in their own best interest.
It is hoped that by consolidating the CTR funds with Energy's
appropriations for Nuclear Material Security Upgrades, the overall
MPC&A effort will proceed far more effectively. 319 At least forty
312. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 83.
313. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 19 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson,
Jr.).
314. See Russian, U.S. Physicists to Devise New Nuclear Control, (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Apr. 8, 1996) FBIS-SOV-96-069.
315. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 83.
316. See id. at 86.
317. See id at 87.
318. See id.
319. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 19 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson,
Jr.), 147 (testimony of Thomas E. McNamara).
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facilities are now participating, or have participated, to some de-
gree in these security upgrades. 320 Unfortunately, this may still
leave as many as ninety-five facilities still uncovered;321 reaching
these additional facilities will require both additional funding, in
the range of $1 billion, 322 and political persuasion, since some core
number of facilities will be considered particularly sensitive, and
thus will not be made readily available.
The security of fissile material within Russian Navy custody is
an additional area of MPC&A concern, deserving special mention.
Due to the U.S. Navy's powerful desire to preserve secrecy con-
cerning propulsion technology, extraordinarily little help has been
offered to the FSU regarding the safe storage and disposition of
naval reactor fuel.323 Because this material constitutes a signifi-
cant, but underappreciated, threat,324 some degree of cooperation
seems to be necessary. The failure to remedy this particular subset
of the MPC&A problem could ultimately prove fatal.
With the exception of Russian naval fuel, the existing
MPC&A upgrade program is on the right track. In deference to
paramount considerations of national security, the available funds
have now been completely allocated to the channel proven most
effective, the Department of Energy. If time were not of the es-
sence, and if the only facilities to be concerned with were in Rus-
sia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, then the matter could
probably rest there. But time is crucial; accordingly, the time it
will take to secure all of the relevant facilities, wherever they are,
must be reduced to the absolute minimum. Every day that can be
eliminated is one less day in which a nuclear black market connec-
tion can be made. Similarly, efforts to address MPC&A concerns
must be extended to all states of the FSU, rather than just to the
four that happened to have custody of the U.S.S.R.'s nuclear
weaponry at the time of the Soviet collapse.
320. See National Security Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Toby T. Gati).
321. There are approximately 135 facilities with fissile material security relevance. See
WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 19 (testimony of Harold J. Johnson, Jr.).
322. This estimate contemplates 95 additional upgraded facilities at a cost of approxi-
mately $5-10 million per upgrade, which is a relatively pessimistic assessment of potential
costs. See id.
323. See id. at 154 (testimony of Frank Miller).
324. See id. at 29 (testimony of William C. Potter).
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2. Enhancing Border Security
Efforts to decrease the fissile material-permeability of the
FSU's borders have involved numerous agencies, but relatively
small amounts of funding. Perhaps this results from the daunting
nature of the task-the FSU has 40,000 miles of border. 325 While
it is true that every incremental improvement raises the bar a bit
more-and thereby decreases the odds of a successful exportation
of fissile material-the overall efficacy of U.S. border enhance-
ment efforts has been limited from the outset by the failure to in-
clude the most at-risk nations in these programs.
326
Efforts to increase border security in the FSU have been di-
vided between the underlying legal regimes and the actual border
control systems. CTR funds have been channeled to a few states
of the FSU in order to enhance export controls, provide training in
interdiction and investigation skills, and provide detection equip-
ment.327 The three states receiving the most funds-Kazakhstan,
$7.26 million; Ukraine, $13.26 million; and Belarus, $16.26 mil-
lion-certainly were in need of this aid as they generally lacked
both the resources for effective border control and the underlying
legal framework of export control laws.328 Unfortunately, the
United States has had less success in aiding Russia itself: only
$2.26 million in aid, essentially for seminars and exchanges, has
been approved for Russia.329
Through the U.S. State Department's Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament Fund, the Baltic states330 obtained detection equip-
ment and established ties to the U.S. Customs Service
(Customs). 331 In addition, Customs provided a training program
involving Eastern European and Baltic nations, complementing
existing training programs provided under the Coordinating
Committee for Export Controls. 332 Recently, Customs took sig-
nificant steps to increase its training capacities, 333 as well as its in-
325. See i&. at 36-37 (testimony of Gary Bertsch).
326. See id. at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
327. See id. at 166 (testimony of Connie Fenchel, Dir., Strategic Investigations Divi-
sion, U.S. Customs Service).
328. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 95.
329. See id&
330. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 167 (testimony of Connie Fenchel).
331. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 95.
332. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 166-67 (testimony of Connie
Fenchel).
333. In addition to a "training team" consisting of a professional trainer, a customs
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formation gathering capabilities. 334
None of these measures, however, address the southern tier,
an area that may prove to be the most significant border security
problem in the FSU.335 The absence of programs designed to im-
prove the security of the borders that lie along the direct route be-
tween fissile material-containing facilities in the FSU and nations
such as Iran and Iraq is a gaping hole in the U.S. border security
enhancement effort. Because of this omission, it is hard to dispute
Professor Allison's characterization of these programs as "little ef-
fort" generating "little progress. '336
3. Intelligence and Law Enforcement-Cooperation and Conflict
In the 1990s, the American intelligence community has been
confronted with an identity crisis of sorts, as the end of the Cold
War has called traditional collection priorities into question.337
Fortunately, the intelligence community has already begun to re-
spond to the threat which succeeded to the position formerly oc-
cupied by the Soviet military threat. WMD intelligence gathering
has now become a "matter of extraordinarily high priority in
[CIA] collection efforts, and [CIA] analytic efforts. ' 338 A series of
Presidential Decision Directives provide the guiding principles for
the intelligence community: prevent WMD acquisition, roll-back
existing WMD capacity, deter WMD use, and enhance military
and emergency assets' ability to respond to a WMD threat.339 The
CIA coordinates these efforts through its Non-Proliferation Cen-
ter,34° which the Director established to assure "an all-source
multi-agency approach" to WMD issues. 34 1 In addition, the CIA
inspector, a customs special agent, an attorney, and a Department of Energy expert, the
Customs Investigative Workforce has individuals trained in WMD investigations. See id.
at 168-69.
334. Customs has 24 overseas offices, and recently received permission to place two
officials in Moscow to improve cooperation with Russian customs and law enforcement.
Customs also has 26 Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements (executive agreements),
providing for law enforcement cooperation. Current agreements exist with Russia, Be-
larus, and Ukraine, and new ones are being negotiated with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
See id.
335. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 96.
336. Id at 93.
337. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 109 (testimony of David A. Kay).
338. Id at 77 (testimony of John Deutch).
339. See id at 171 (testimony of Gordon C. Oehler).
340. See id. at 172.
341. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 81 (testimony of John Deutch).
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has begun to address the information gap342 in the southern tier
area.
343
The coordination of intelligence and law enforcement activi-
ties, however, presents a problem. The FBI has begun rapid over-
seas expansion programs in response to the increasingly interna-
tional nature of the crimes within its jurisdiction. 344 In particular,
organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism have all con-
tributed to the need to develop a significant overseas presence for
the first time in the Bureau's history.345 The National Security Act
of 1947346 theoretically restrains the FBI's expansion, but despite
this restriction, the FBI has gone forward with plans to double the
number of overseas offices from twenty-three to forty-six. 347 After
some initial resistance, both the CIA and the Department of State
appear to have acquiesced in this expansion.348 With a presence in
MOSCOW, 34 9 and a planned presence in Kiev specifically targeting
nuclear smuggling,350 these developments bode well for future
U.S. counter-proliferation law enforcement efforts in the FSU,
which currently cannot be based closer than Vienna or Athens.351
And yet, "[i]ntelligence that is not shared is intelligence that will
not be used" 352 and it appears the CIA and FBI have not yet mas-
tered the art of working together effectively.353 A Presidential
Commission (Commission) co-chaired by Harold Brown, and first,
Les Aspin, and later, Warren Rudman, concluded that significantly
greater cooperation is needed. 354 Recently, however, strides have
342. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement authorities have traditionally lacked a
presence in the Caucuses and Central Asia. See id. at 32 (testimony of Sarah Mullen).
343. See id. at 172 (testimony of Gordon C. Oehler).
344. See Jeffrey Smith & Thomas W. Lippman, FBI Plans to Expand Overseas: 23
New Offices Slated, Raising Some Criticism at State Department, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
1996, at Al.
345. See id.
346. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988). The FBI is confined to domestic investigations unless it
obtains specific permission and cooperation for an international investigation from the
CIA. See Shoshana V. Asnis, Comment, Controlling the Russian Mafia: Russian Legal
Confusion and U.S. Jurisdictional Power-Play, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 299, 316 (1996).
347. See Smith & Lippman, supra note 344.
348. See id.
349. See Asnis, supra note 346.
350. See Smith & Lippman, supra note 344.
351. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 164 (testimony of Robert M. Blit-
zer).
352. See id. at 109 (testimony David A. Kay).
353. See id. at 34 (testimony of Sarah Mullen).
354. See WMD Hearings Part I, supra note 8, at 82 (testimony of Senator Sam Nunn).
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been made: regular meetings were established between then-
Director of Central Intelligence Deutch (DCI) and Director Freeh
of the FBI, and between then-Deputy Director of Intelligence
(and current DCI-nominee) George Tenet and Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick. Moreover, officers from both agencies
have been cross-assigned. 355 Whether these steps have been suffi-
ciently institutionalized, however, remains to be seen.
The challenge of international terrorism has further blurred
the artificial line between intelligence and law enforcement activi-
ties. Left to their own devices to achieve their respective missions,
the FBI and the CIA have moved independently to address the
WMD challenge, and they have only just begun to coordinate and
economize their efforts. This process would be enhanced by spe-
cific guidance to compel institutionalized cooperation, with the
comparative advantages of each organization 356 employed to
maximum advantage as part of the overall counter-proliferation,
counter-terrorism effort.
4. Addressing the Economics of Insider Theft and "Brain Drain"
The economic plight of scientists in the FSU is as much a part
of the fissile material theft risk as is inadequate MPC&A.357
These scientists were once relatively well-paid, and provided with
ample research facilities and tasks. Now they are underpaid, if
paid at all, and have little or no work or research resources. 358
This combination of economic deprivation and idleness greatly
enhances the possibility that these individuals will either "drain" to
a proliferant state or organization, or worse, steal fissile material
from their own facilities to sell on the black market.359 The
United States has attempted to alleviate these causal factors by
funding the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC),
as well as a cluster of defense conversion projects.360
ISTC, a cooperatively-funded venture of the United States,
the European Union, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, began in
355. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 82 (testimony of John Deutch).
356. For example, although the United States has cooperative law enforcement rela-
tionships with many nations, there are many other nations with whom no such ties exist.
In some of the latter cases, the intelligence community does have good ties. See idL at 84
(testimony of Senator Sam Nunn).
357. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 80.
358. See supra Part III.A.3.
359. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 33 (testimony of Sarah Mullen).
360. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 89-92.
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1994.361 It has provided non-military work for approximately
11,000 of the FSU's weapons scientists362 at facilities in Moscow
and Kiev.363 In 1994, the U.S. provided $25 million for ISTC, fol-
lowed by $24 million in 1995. By the year 2000, however, the pro-
gram will be funded on an entirely private basis. 36
4
For all its good intentions, ISTC is fundamentally limited by
its inability to fund every scientist of proliferation concem 365 and
by the uncertainty of its annual funding, which decreases the
"lure" of ISTC work.366 Moreover, increasing the magnitude and
certainty of U.S. funding is a task that runs counter to the general
political currents in Congress, which misperceives ISTC as a for-
eign aid measure rather than a national security program.367
Defense conversion programs have even worse political
problems. The original attempts to use CTR funds to convert FSU
military facilities provoked "severe political criticism. '368 A more
successful program is the Defense Enterprise Fund of the Depart-
ment of Energy, which provides grants to U.S. firms for joint ven-
tures involving the conversion of FSU facilities.369 More impor-
tant from a fissile material security perspective, the Industrial
Partnering Program (IPP) provides funds for private U.S. firms to
conduct joint ventures with facilities and scientists from the FSU
nuclear weapons complex.370 Thus far, IPP has employed ap-
proximately 2000 additional scientists,371 complementing the ISTC
effort.
Despite these successes, the domestic political vulnerability of
these programs runs high in an era of tight budgets and general-
ized hostility to foreign affairs spending.372 These programs are
national security measures, not foreign aid, and thus deserve to fall
361. See id at 90.
362. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 142 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
363. See id at 155 (testimony of Frank Miller).
364. See id. at 177 (testimony of Thomas E. McNamara).
365. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 91.
366. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 142 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
367. See WMD Hearings Part I, supra note 8, at 145 (testimony of Senator Sam Nunn);
see also WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 90 (testimony of Graham T. Allison).
36& See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 92.
369. See id
370. See id.
371. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 142 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
372. See generally Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Nickel-and-Diming Foreign Policy, WASH.
POST, Jan. 17, 1997, at A21.
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under the heading "defense by other means. ' 373 Until a wider ap-
preciation of the real stakes is generated, however, the necessary
political willpower will continue to lack.
5. Policies of Acquisition and Elimination
The foregoing security enhancement measures, no matter how
extensively they are implemented, can never provide an absolute
guarantee against fissile material theft. So long as this material
exists in weapons-usable form, it remains subject to some risk of
theft. Therefore, it makes good policy sense from a national secu-
rity perspective for the United States to purchase as much of the
fissile material in the FSU as possible and then either burn it or
store it under maximum security conditions. Actual U.S. efforts to
pursue an acquisition policy have been inconsistent, however, and
hindered by inadequate prioritization. 374
HEU has been the primary focus of U.S. acquisition efforts. 375
During the Bush administration, Russia and the United States
reached a remarkable agreement. Russia would sell 500 tons of
HEU, approximately half of the entire Russian stockpile, to the
United States in exchange for hard currency (HEU Deal).376 This
HEU would first be blended with low-enrichment uranium in
Russia, then shipped to the United States to be burned as fuel in
civilian reactors.377 Securing material sufficient to create 40,000
nuclear weapons, some saw the agreement as a dramatic national
security victory. 378 Notwithstanding this perception, the HEU
Deal has been dominated from the beginning by commercial, not
national security, interests and has in practice failed to significantly
impact the fissile material security issue.379
The source of the problem is the vesting of authority for im-
plementation of the HEU deal in a semi-public company known as
the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC). USEC was
created in 1993 to take over the United States' two civilian ura-
373. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 152 (testimony of Frank Miller).
374. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 81.
375. See generally Richard A. Falkenrath, Appendix C: The HEU Deal, in Avoiding
Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile
Material 229 (1996).
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See All Things Considered: Troubled Uranium Deal With Russia on Gore Agenda
(National Public Radio, June 27, 1995), available in 1995 WL 2918599.
379. See Falkenrath, supra note 375, at 231.
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nium enrichment facilities, formerly run by the Department of En-
ergy.380 With substantial government support, USEC's production
costs are highly competitive. It costs USEC approximately $50 to
$68 per Separative Work Units (SWU), the measure of the work of
enrichment. 381 In contrast, the SWU purchase price under the
HEU Deal is $82.10 per SWU, giving USEC an incentive to take
as little of the Russian HEU as possible.
382
Not surprisingly, the U.S. has acquired extraordinarily few of
the 500 tons of HEU thus far, and U.S. reactors have burned only
13 tons.383 Worse, the term of implementation is 20 years, despite
the risk that Russian willingness to participate in the agreement
may change.384 In short, the "narrow commercial interests of the
domestic uranium enrichment industry [have] cripple[d] the im-
plementation of the HEU deal," to the detriment of national se-
curity.385 USEC recognizes, but disregards, the conflict. As one
USEC official put it, "I don't conduct national security here ... I
actually run a business. '386 From a national security perspective,
this is intolerable; the HEU Deal should not be subject to the dis-
cretion of an entity with contrary incentives.387
The United States has acted far more assertively, on another
occasion, to acquire unsecured fissile material. In Project Sap-
phire, the U.S. removed more than 1000 pounds of HEU from
Kazakhstan. 388 This was sufficient material for at least twenty
weapons, at a cost of approximately $20 million.389 In this case,
380. See id. at 232.
381. See Kilzer & Imse, supra note 244.
382. See id The existence of trade agreements restricting FSU access to the U.S. ura-
nium market further complicate the situation. In the early 1990's, imports of FSU ura-
nium skyrocketed, sending down prices, and triggering an anti-dumping investigation that
was only halted by the signing of market access "suspension agreements." See Falken-
rath, supra note 375, at 232.
383. See Kilzer & Imse, supra note 244; see also Thomas Elleman, Without Notice,
Power Industry is Turning "Kilotons to Kilowatts" Plants Are Using Fuel Derived From
Weapons-Grade Uranium, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORDS, Jan. 26, 1997, at F3, avail-
able in 1997 WL 4569532.
384. See Kilzer & Imse, supra note 244.
385. Falkenrath, supra note 375, at 233.
386. Kilzer & Imse, supra note 244.
387. If necessary, the domestic uranium market can be protected while still enhancing
national security. For example, the Russian HEU could be stockpiled, and only released
into the market slowly, over the long-term. In the meantime, it should be acquired as
quickly and as completely as possible. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 43.
388. See id. at 44.
389. See id.
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decisive U.S. intervention may have prevented proliferation, as
both Pakistan 390 and Iran391 had previously expressed interest in
acquiring this cache. In late 1995, a second cache of Kazak HEU
was discovered, containing approximately 440 pounds of mate-
rial.392 Negotiations to acquire this HEU have floundered, in part
due to Russia's assertion of ownership over the material. 393 In the
meantime, the HEU remains in highly unsecured conditions.394 A
similar impasse exists regarding a Georgian cache, and further
caches are likely to be discovered in the other states of the FSU.
395
The U.S. experience with HEU acquisition has thus been a
matter of multiple opportunities with only isolated success. This is
an unfortunate record, since the most effective means of prevent-
ing the formation of a fissile material black market is to control or
destroy the material itself. The failure of the U.S. to completely
embrace a strategy of acquisition at all costs is largely the result of
the inclusion of commercial perspectives within the decision proc-
ess. These perspectives are included, it appears, in order to en-
hance the political palatability of acquisition programs, by enlist-
ing potential opponents such as the domestic uranium industry. In
combination with a general lack of public support for international
spending, however, these interests have effectively prevented ac-
quisition efforts from being fast-tracked on a systematic scale, de-
spite the national security interest of the United States.
Acquisition of plutonium is even more restricted by commer-
cial sensibilities.396 With HEU, the political support for acquisi-
tion has been greatly enhanced by the fact that the material can be
burned as fuel in civilian reactors, thus providing a domestic bene-
fit in addition to the national security purpose. With plutonium,
however, the national security purpose stands alone. Unlike most
nations with nuclear industries, the U.S. has traditionally eschewed
the use of plutonium as fuel because of a combination of economic
concerns, proliferation concerns, and general political opposition
to the expansion of the nuclear industry.397 From a national secu-
390. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 138 (testimony of Alan Edelman).
391. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 44.
392. See Unguarded Nuclear Material, supra note 105.
393. See id.
394. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 29 (testimony of William C. Potter).
395. See id.; see also Unguarded Nuclear Material supra note 105.
396. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 38, at 44.
397. See Peter Passell, U.S. Set to Allow Reactors to use Plutonium from Disarmed
Bombs, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1996, at Al.
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rity perspective, these concerns should be irrelevant. Rather than
spending millions of dollars upgrading security at a given FSU fa-
cility, the U.S. should, when it has the option, seek outright acqui-
sition of the material. Without the additional support of a com-
mercial benefit, however, the political momentum to achieve this
sensible goal seems to be inadequate. A recent policy shift by the
Clinton Administration may, however, provide the foundation for
the introduction of such an interest.
398
Building on the conclusions of an expert panel of the National
Academy of Science, the Department of Energy announced a two-
track plutonium policy in December of 1996. Previously, the most
likely long-term plutonium disposition option for the U.S. was
glass vitrification and burial.399 The new policy would, for the first
time, allow existing plutonium in nuclear weapons to be burned as
mixed-oxide fuel (MOX), while maintaining the policy of vitrifica-
tion for the disposal of plutonium generated incidental to ongoing
production.40 0 This decision "launched a national debate," 401 with
nuclear industry opponents perceiving this to be a significant set-
back in their efforts to decrease the use of nuclear energy.402
The MOX option, however, is expensive; it may cost as much
as $2.3 billion dollars,40 3 a large part of which will be devoted to
subsidizing the extra expenses associated with handling MOX
fuel. 40 4 Utility companies have, however, expressed substantial in-
terest in the program and recognize the potential benefits of the
MOX option;405 the combined plutonium stockpiles of the United
States and Russia would generate 500 partial reloads of MOX, an
amount equivalent to the electrical output of 8 billion barrels of
oil, worth approximately $500 billion.40 6 The MOX decision thus
opens the door to utilization of commercial incentives to buttress
398. Id
399. See Russian Nuclear Archipelago, supra note 77, at 198.
400. See Passell, supra note 397.
401. Nuclear Nightmare: Pantex Could Play a Major Role in Disposal, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 1997, at A14, available in 1997 WL 2640593.
402 See Mary L. Walker, The U.S. Should Cooperate With Russia On Plutonium; Anti-
Nuclear Groups Opposed to Converting Excess Warhead Material Are Misguided,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 1997, at 19, available in 1997 WL 2798737.
403. See Some U.S. Plutonium Will Power Plants, B. GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1996, at A10.
404. See Passell, supra note 397.
405. As many as 17 utilities have already indicated an interest in MOX fuel. See
Walker, supra note 402.
406. See Barclay G. Jones, Atomic Terrorism: The Real Threat, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12,
1996, at 31.
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the national security argument in favor of acquiring FSU pluto-
nium.40 7 To the degree that this melding of interests allows plu-
tonium acquisition to take place, it is a step in the right direction.
As seen in the uranium context, though, this can lead to counter-
productive incentives from a security perspective. In an ideal
world, it would not be necessary to use an economic carrot to gen-
erate the political momentum necessary to establish a policy that
directly addresses a clear and present danger to the national secu-
rity of the United States.
6. Developing a Coordinated Approach
A broader concern regarding the U.S. response to the nuclear
terrorism threat is the possibility of inadequate coordination at the
highest levels of government. In 1995, the President's Council of
Advisors in Science & Technology issued a report that inspired a
Presidential Decision Directive providing for coordination of the
general counter-proliferation effort.40 8 This Directive delineated
the responsibilities of different agencies, and called for coordina-
tion of the inter-agency effort through a working group headed by
a representative of the National Security Council.40 9 It included
representatives from State, Defense, Energy, Commerce, Customs,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the intelligence community,
and the FBI.410 Despite this framework, the hearings of the Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations revealed significant con-
cerns regarding inadequate organization of the counter-WMD ef-
fort.4 11
B. Flaws and Limitations of the Existing Approach
Manifest in the wake of the Permanent Subcommittee's
hearings were the flaws in the existing approach. Programs de-
signed to increase MPC&A have been improved substantially by
consolidation within the Department of Energy, but are still not
407. See id
408. See WMD Hearings Part II, supra note 18, at 174 (testimony of Thomas E.
McNamara).
409. See id.
410. See id at 162 (testimony of Robert M. Blitzer).
411. For example, Senator Nunn observed that over 100 different offices had some
degree of involvement with the issue, and that there appeared to be insufficient coordina-
tion of their efforts. No mention was made of the NSC-chaired committee later described
by Blitzer and McNamara. See WMD Hearing Part I, supra note 8, at 83 (testimony of
Senator Sam Nunn).
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moving at maximum speed, are not reaching naval facilities, and in
any event, are not assured of receiving the funding necessary to
complete upgrades at every facility.412 Border security enhance-
ment programs are demonstrably inadequate in their failure to fo-
cus on the southern tier of the FSU, although individually they are
effective in contributing to the gradual improvement of systems
practically non-existent in some states. 413 The intelligence com-
munity, on the other hand, appears to have recognized the impor-
tance of the southern tier and has taken steps to remedy the in-
formation gap therein. At the same time, however, the growing
overlap between intelligence and FBI activities abroad cries out
for institutionalized coordination.414 Programs designed to de-
crease the incentives for insider theft and "brain drain" have been
limited by domestic political opposition premised on fundamental
misconceptions regarding the nature of the aid being rendered.415
This problem is even more pronounced in the context of fissile ma-
terial acquisition programs, in which the paramount national secu-
rity interests have been subordinated to relatively inconsequential
commercial concerns.4 16
These flaws have a common thread: they all flow from the fact
that there has been no comprehensive effort to generate a wide-
spread appreciation for the true magnitude of the fissile material
crisis among both policymakers and the public. Despite the best
efforts of concerned legislators, such as Senators Lugar and Nunn,
there is simply no impression of urgency, as there was, for exam-
ple, behind the Marshall Plan, or the Manhattan Project.417 None-
theless, those who do appreciate the stakes continue to work
within existing constraints to improve U.S. efforts. The most re-
cent effort to prevent the acquisition and use of mass destruction
weapons by terrorists and rogue nations,418 sponsored by Senators
Nunn, Lugar, and Pete Domenici (R-NM), is entitled the Defense
412. See supra Part IV.A.1.
413. See supra Part IV.A.2.
414. See supra Part IV.A.3.
415. See supra Part IV.A.4.
416. See supra Part IV.A.5.
417. Senator Lugar has called for a "Manhattan Project II." See Senator Richard
Lugar, Remarks before the Nuclear Roundtable, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Co-
operative Threat Reduction, Apr. 29, 1996, (visited on Sept. 5, 1997)
<http://www.stimson.org/rd-tablelugar.htm> [hereinafter Lugar Remarks].
418. See id
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Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (DAWMD). 419
V. A RECENT LEGISLATIVE ATrEMPT To CORRECT OUR COURSE
DAWMD sought to address, to the greatest extent possible,
the issues raised during the Permanent Subcommittee hearings on
the threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.420  Loosely
grouped into the categories of domestic preparedness, interdiction
of WMD material, and coordination, DAWMD constitutes a sig-
nificant improvement over the status quo in marshaling the re-
sources of the United States to fight nuclear terrorism, its precur-
sors, and its consequences. The new law does not go far enough,
however, nor could it, at least not without an alteration of the po-
litical landscape sufficient to create enhanced political willpower
throughout government and society. Such an awakening of the
national consciousness is likely to be brought about in only two
ways: either from the sharp shock of a dramatic, tragic event, or
from a broad-based commitment to action resulting from a deci-
sive and comprehensive program of persuasion emanating from
the highest levels of government. It is probably that the latter
course will depend on the commitment of the persuasive powers of
the Presidency itself.
A. DAWMD: A Small Step in the Right Direction
DAWMD is indisputably an improvement over the array of
existing U.S. responses to the WMD threat. For the first time, the
ability of the United States to deal with the gruesome aftermath of
WMD terrorism has been addressed and enhanced. DAWMD
bolsters border security measures in the FSU and the United
States, enhances MPC&A efforts, and compels top-level coordi-
nation of the overall effort.421 Furthermore, DAWMD contains a
series of "Sense of Congress" messages that directly address spe-
cific concerns raised in the hearings. DAWMD may not suffice to
constitute a "Manhattan Project II," but it will measurably im-
prove the national security posture of the United States.
419. 50 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1996).
420. See Lugar Remarks, supra note 417.
421. Richard Lugar, Press Release, Indianapolis Selected To Establish Terrorism Re-
sponse Program, Fed. Doc. Clearing House, Feb. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4429400.
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1. Domestic Preparedness
The goal of the domestic preparedness section of DAWMD is
not to prevent WMD terrorism; rather, it is to "allow the Depart-
ment of Defense and other federal agencies to transfer their
knowledge of chemical, biological and nuclear warfare to civilian
forces," thus enhancing the capabilities of emergency response as-
sets.422 In furtherance of this goal, §2311 requires that the Presi-
dent take immediate steps to enhance the response capabilities of
federal, state, and local governments. 423 These steps must include
a report to Congress assessing existing capabilities and making
recommendations for improvements, including new legislation.
424
Rather than await the outcome of this report, however, DAWMD
enacts several measures designed to bring about immediate im-
provements in domestic preparedness. Specifically, it creates a
two-part framework for training personnel to deal with the after-
math of a WMD attack, and for organizing emergency re-
sources.425
The training regime centers around § 2312, which creates the
Emergency Response Assistance Program (ERAP), a $35 million
effort to enhance response capabilities at the federal, state, and lo-
cal levels. 426 Administered by the Secretary of Defense (until
1999, at which point another agency may be appointed as lead
agency), ERAP draws on the expertise of the Departments of De-
fense, Energy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), and any other federal, state, or local agencies with rele-
vant expertise. 427 ERAP must include: (1) training in the use and
maintenance of equipment designed to detect WMD-material and
equipment used in protection and decontamination; (2) a "hotline"
for state and local authorities to obtain advice and data in the
event of an emergency; (3) equipment loans; and (4) National
Guard assistance.428 Furthermore, § 2312 specifically provides
that $10.5 million of the $35 million be used by the Secretary of
Defense with the cooperation of the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services to create Metropolitan Medical Strike Force
422. See id
423. 50 U.S.C. § 2311 (1991 & Supp. 1997).
424. Id. § 2311(b).
425. See id § 2312(a)-(b).
426. See id. § 2312(h).
427. See idt § 2312 (a)-(b).
428. See id § 2312 (e).
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Teams.429 These teams, to be deployed in twenty-six cities, will re-
ceive specialized training, and will be "optimally equipped" to re-
spond to a WMD attack.430 Further transfers of knowledge are
promoted by § 2316, which requires that the President act to de-
crease civilian law enforcement reliance on Department of De-
fense expertise in the counter-WMD area.431
In order to facilitate ERAP, the Departments of Defense and
Energy must each nominate an official as the "Program Coordina-
tor" in charge of coordinating that Department's training ef-
forts.4 32 The improvement brought about by these efforts will be
tracked by annual testing of federal, state, and local response ca-
pabilities. 433
Section 2317 complements the training regime by requiring
that FEMA develop a master inventory of assets available to state
and local officials in the event of an emergency. 434 Every Federal
Response Plan agency must submit to FEMA an inventory of
equipment and other assets available in an emergency. 435 FEMA
must then incorporate these inventories into the relevant emer-
gency programs, including equipment usage guidance.436 FEMA
must also create a hotline in order to facilitate state and local ac-
cess to this information. 437
2. Interdiction of WMD Material
DAWMD also seeks to address the border security concerns
identified in the 1996 hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee.
Section 2333 provides $15 million for border security assistance
programs throughout the FSU, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe.438
Administered cooperatively between the Departments of Defense
and Customs, this assistance can include training, advice, and
equipment loans.439 The law also exempts this aid from the effects
of any other prohibitions on aid to the FSU, so long as the Presi-
429. See idL § 2312 (h)(2).
430. See Lugar Remarks, supra note 417.
431. See 50 U.S.C. § 2316.
432. See id. § 2313.
433. See id § 2315.
434. See id § 2317(e).
435. See id. § 2317(a).
436. See ia § 2317(b)-(c).
437. See id § 2317(e).
438. See id. § 2333(a)-(b).
439. See id § 2333(a).
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dent certifies to Congress that this particular aid furthers the na-
tional interest of the United States.4 Some degree of overlap be-
tween this Defense/Customs program and the existing training
program run by the FBI and the Department of Defense is both
expected and approved.441 DAWMD also provides $15 million for
the purchase of detection and interdiction equipment for U.S. bor-
der security,442 and urges the U.S. Sentencing Commission to con-
sider enhanced sentences for WMD import and export offenses.
443
3. MPC&A Measures
DAWMD contains a mix of MPC&A enhancement measures,
as do related sections of the CTR program. In four separate
"Sense of the Congress" provisions, DAWMD directly confronts
problems inherent in the existing U.S. approach. Section 2361
urges the Departments of Defense, Energy, Treasury and State to
contract directly with entities in the FSU when implementing the
fissile material control measures contained in § 2341." 4 Section
2341 in turn requires the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to co-
operatively develop a plan to modify or replace the reactor cores
at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 with cores less suitable to the pro-
duction of weapons-grade material. 445 Section 2363 urges the ex-
pansion of CTR programs to include other FSU states, besides
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.446 A pair of provisions
recommend a policy of fissile material acquisition: in general, fis-
sile material at risk of theft should be purchased and imported
when no reasonable alternatives to secure it exist,447 and specifi-
cally, blended-down HEU from Russian weapons should be pur-
chased in all circumstances. 448 Additional provisions encourage
other nations to help in efforts to acquire and eliminate stockpiles
of fissile material.449 This last provision may contribute to U.S.
approval of a potential agreement to send Russian plutonium to
440. See id. § 2333(c).
441. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-724, at 820 (1996) [hereinafter CONFERENCE
REPORT].
442. See 50 U.S.C. § 2331.
443. See id § 2332.
444. See id. § 2361.
445. See id. § 2341.
446. See id § 2363.
447. See id § 2365.
448. See idt § 2364.
449. See id
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Germany to be burned as MOX fuel in a new, but currently dor-
mant, facility in Hesse.450 An additional measure, § 2362, author-
izes CTR funds to be transferred between CTR programs when
necessary to "maximize the effectiveness" of the programs.451
In terms of the actual dollars allocated to MPC&A related
programs, Congress did move aggressively in the direction of more
sufficient funding, despite continued reluctance by the House of
Representatives. 452 This move was fostered by the leadership of
the conferees reconciling the competing versions of the National
Defense Authorization Act, which contained both CTR and
DAWMD.453 The House version actually dropped $25 million
from the CTR budget request of $327.9 million, while the Senate
approved full funding for CTR and provided extra funds for
DAWMD.454 The conferees, explicitly recognizing the importance
of these programs, approved an extra $37 million on top of the
original CTR budget request, for a total funding level of $365 mil-
lion.455 Furthermore, an additional $164 million beyond the initial
budget request was approved for non-CTR counter-proliferation
programs, such as the Department of Energy's MPC&A program
and DAWMD.456
4. Enhanced Coordination
DAWMD attempts to resolve the problem of inter-agency
coordination by designating a single official to head a coordinating
committee within the National Security Council (NSC). Specifi-
cally, § 2351 creates the Executive Office position of National Co-
ordinator on Nonproliferation (NCN).457 The NCN, supervised by
the NSC, has three responsibilities. First, the NCN serves as an
advisor to the President on the WMD aspects of terrorism, arms
control, and international organized crime.458 Second, the NCN
chairs an NSC committee (discussed below). 459 Third, the NCN
450. See Mathews, supra note 63.
451. 50 U.S.C. § 2362.
452. CTR funding, for example, was cut 20% in the preceding year. WMD Hearings
Part 1, supra note 18, at 153 (testimony of Frank Miller).
453. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 441, at 816.
454. See id. at 816-17.
455. See id.
456. See id
457. See 50 U.S.C. § 2351(a).
458. See id. § 2351(b)(1).
459. See i § 2351(b)(2).
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coordinates nonproliferation research efforts conducted by, or
funded by, the federal government.
460
The NCN chairs the NSC Committee on Nonproliferation
(CON), established by § 2352.461 CON has a variety of responsi-
bilities and includes representatives from State, Defense, CIA,
Justice, Energy, FEMA, Treasury, Commerce, and others desig-
nated by the President.462 CON must "review and coordinate" all
federal efforts concerning WMD proliferation.463 CON also must
give recommendations to the President, via the NSC, concerning
the integration of these efforts,464 the integration of related federal
budget items,465 and the progress and status of efforts to enhance
federal, state, and local crisis management capabilities.466 CON is
also responsible for making recommendations designed to enhance
cooperation and coordination of programs addressing the follow-
ing WMD-proliferation subjects: smuggling prevention, law en-
forcement, the role of organized crime, WMD-material and tech-
nology security, coordination of law enforcement, intelligence, and
agency efforts, enhancement of export controls, and general pro-
liferation reduction.467 The final coordination measure contained
in DAWMD is the requirement that the President, through CON,
develop a comprehensive program to execute the entirety of
DAWMD. 468
B. Persistent Flaws and Limitations: The Impact of Political
Constraints
Both the NCN office and CON are subject to dissolution at
the President's discretion after September 30, 1999.469 This per-
haps reflects an optimistic hope that the problems compelling the
enactment of DAWMD will by then be on the decline. Unfortu-
nately, such optimism would not be well-founded. Although
DAWMD and the related increases in funding of CTR and En-
460. See id § 2351(b)(3). In addition, § 2351(c) provides $2 million for the Depart-
ment of Defense to conduct this research. See id. § 2351(c).
461. See id § 2352(a).
462. See id. § 2352(b).
463. See id. § 2352(c)(1).
464. See id. § 2352(c)(2)(A).
465. See idL § 2352(c)(2)(B).
466. See id § 2352(c)(2)(C).
467. See id. § 2352(c)(2)(D).
46& See id. § 2353(a).
469. See id § 2354.
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ergy-sponsored MPC&A programs constitute a significant step
forward in the effort to fix the flaws in the existing U.S. approach,
the changes they embody do not fully achieve that goal. This is
not meant to downplay the tremendous success achieved by the
congressional leaders who led the fight for these measures. Real-
istically, the 1996 legislation probably represents the most progress
achievable in an atmosphere of political hostility towards foreign
affairs spending and inadequate appreciation of the national secu-
rity interest involved.
Due to these political constraints, a variety of problems with
the U.S. efforts remain. For example, MPC&A and border secu-
rity programs both require still greater levels of funding, and the
Russian Naval fuel cycle remains unaddressed. Further, it remains
to be seen whether the United States will actually take aggressive
action to promote a policy of acquisition without regard to com-
mercial interests. There have been no significant changes in U.S.
policies designed to ameliorate the economic pressures on FSU
scientists. This list could go on, but after a time it becomes obvi-
ous that many of these difficulties are beyond legislative reach al-
together; instead, they are matters which require Executive action,
though this in turn requires the political willpower to address
them. The ultimate lesson of the government's various attempts to
confront this problem is that a truly effective range of responses
cannot be implemented until that political momentum is gener-
ated. In the meantime, a gaping window of opportunity exists for
terrorist organizations or their sponsor states to acquire fissile ma-
terial.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates the existence of a clear and present
danger to the national security of the United States. Although the
United States has remained ever-vigilant against terrorist activity,
never before has the prevention of a particular type of terrorist at-
tack been appropriately considered a paramount national security
interest. In part, this reflects the fundamental cohesiveness of U.S.
society; we simply lack the type of foundational divisions which-
undermine some other societies. The unique power of a nuclear
weapon, however, would enable a terrorist group to overcome
these natural defenses, and strike a forceful blow against the same
societal stability that has until now protected the United States. It
is a danger of the highest order, but it is not yet understood as
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such.
There is an overwhelming consensus that the only hard part
about building a nuclear weapon is obtaining fissile material.
470
There is also widespread agreement that, due to the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, an abundant supply of this material has re-
cently become extraordinarily vulnerable to theft.471 Economic
pressures on those in a position to facilitate an "insider" theft, and
a lack of anything more than rudimentary export and border con-
trols, exacerbate the problem. It is also extremely likely that at
least a subset of terrorist groups and their sponsor states desire this
material. Thus, it is not surprising to learn that several attempts at
fissile material smuggling are known to have taken place, and that
a host of others are suspected. Significantly, this information is
almost exclusively derived from experience in Europe; almost
nothing is known of potential fissile material trafficking in the
southern tier of the former Soviet Union.
In response to this situation, the U.S. developed multiple pro-
grams and policies, implemented by numerous agencies. Over the
years, the flaws inherent in these approaches have become readily
identifiable, as have the gaps in coverage. Unfortunately, despite
assertive leadership by some legislators, the political willpower to
deal with this problem in a manner that effectively overcomes
those flaws and fills those gaps within Congress as a whole seems
nonexistent. Furthermore, there are aspects of these flaws and
gaps that are beyond the reach of Congress in any event, particu-
larly to the degree that they require diplomatic pressure on the
former Soviet Union to cooperate in our efforts.
In conclusion, the national security interest of the United
States cannot tolerate the status quo. There is simply too much at
stake not to make additional efforts to accelerate, and expand the
scope of, the counter-proliferation effort. At the same time, it is
clear that inadequate appreciation of this danger by some politi-
cians, and most of the public, constitutes an effective check upon
the ability of any branch of government to proceed much further
beyond existing measures. That check must be removed. This can
be achieved through the energetic engagement of the Presidency,
communicating to the nation the nature of the nuclear terrorism
risk. An effective use of the "bully pulpit" might generate the po-
470. See Fissile Material Primer, supra note 25, at 225.
471. See Mirsky, supra note 5, at 751.
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litical momentum necessary to allow the federal government to act
with maximum speed, resource dedication, and comprehensive-
ness.
There is, on the other hand, the possibility that public opinion
will be aroused without such active intervention; when a credible
threat of nuclear terrorism against the United States is finally
made, or if, God forbid, a nuclear device is detonated, there will be
political pressure the likes of which have never been seen before.
It is incumbent upon lawmakers and executive officials to act with
all haste to prevent this nightmare from happening. We must not
be left asking ourselves why we did not do more when we had the
chance.
